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Ransomware has rapidly emerged as a cyber threat which costs the global economy billions 
of dollars a year. Since 2015, ransomware criminals have increasingly targeted state and local 
government institutions. These institutions provide critical infrastructure – e.g., emergency 
services, water, and tax collection – yet they often operate using outdated technology due to limited 
budgets. This vulnerability makes state and local institutions prime targets for ransomware attacks. 
Many states have begun to realize the growing threat from ransomware and other cyber threats and 
have responded through legislative action. When and how is this legislation effective in preventing 
ransomware attacks? This dissertation investigates the effects of state cybersecurity legislation on 
the number of ransomware attacks on state and local institutions from 2015-2019. I review various 
arguments linking cybersecurity legislation to cybersecurity vulnerability and develop a set of 
hypotheses about the features of legislation that should deter and prevent ransomware attacks. The 
cybersecurity literature suggests increased training is a key mechanism to prevent ransomware 
attacks. However, I find no relationship between direct state legislation on cybersecurity training 
and ransomware. Instead, the statistical evidence suggests that there are fewer ransomware attacks 
in states with legislation that indirectly encourages training by shifting the responsibility for a 
cyber failure back onto vulnerable institutions. This legislation typically focuses on data breaches 
and often requires the institution to disclose failures, which increases reputational costs. The threat 
of increased costs for a cybersecurity failure changes these institutions’ cost benefit analysis and 
 
 
encourages these institutions to proactively improve their cybersecurity, such as through increased 
training. I further examine data breach laws in California and find evidence that these types of 
laws can promote increased cybersecurity measures. Thus, future legislation should focus on 
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In January of 2020, the Town of Colonie, New York faced a hostage situation. In this case, 
the hostage was not a person, but the entire town. This may sound like the half-cocked plans of a 
super villain from a fictional spy movie, but it is actually a reality faced by more and more cities 
across the world. The Town of Colonie was just the newest victim to the rapidly growing issue of 
ransomware.  
Ransomware is a type of malicious software that encrypts a victim’s data and demands a 
ransom payment within a limited time window in exchange for a decryption key. If the victim 
refuses to pay, they risk losing their data forever (Kaspersky 2020). The hackers were able to infect 
the town’s computer system with ransomware after town employees received emails that appeared 
to be from fellow employees, but were in fact phishing attempts with ransomware embedded inside 
(Carbonite 2020). Hours later Colonie’s computer systems had been encrypted and the local 
government, including critical infrastructure, such as public safety, came to a screeching halt. 
Anonymous hackers then demanded $400,000.00 to release the decryption key for the town’s data 
(Franco January, 2020).  Local leaders faced a critical decision: pay the ransom to (hopefully) 
restore their systems or refuse and risk losing any data that was not backed up.  
 In the back of their minds was certainly the outcome of similar attacks, such as the 
ransomware attack on the city of Baltimore, Maryland only 8 months earlier. Niraj Chokshi with 
the New York Times reports the attack shutdown “voice mail, email, a parking fines database, and 
a system used to pay water bills, property taxes and vehicle citations” (Chokshi 2019). The 
criminals demanded payment of around $76,000.00 in bitcoins, a difficult-to-track digital 
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currency. They gave the city four days to comply or the demand amount would increase and 
advised if payment was not received within ten days the data would be lost forever.  Despite the 
demands and with over 10,000 computers infected throughout the metropolitan, Baltimore’s 
leaders refused to pay the ransom. However, Ian Duncan with the Baltimore Sun reports the city 
has since paid an estimated $18.2 million to recover its data and restore its systems (Duncan 2019).  
The City of Baltimore is not alone as ransomware attacks have been increasing at a 
dramatic rate. Emsisoft, a cybersecurity company, estimates that the United States suffered more 
than $7.5 billion in damages caused by ransomware in 2019 (Emsisoft 2019). Damages from these 
cyber-attacks have been dramatically increasing over the past 5 years as global costs were at only 
$325 million in 2015 (Morgan 2017). With costs on the rise, the FBI recommends not paying a 
ransom, as there are many cases where the data is still not released and paying a ransom encourages 
further attacks (FBI 2016). In that spirit, some cities have refused to pay the ransoms, but have still 
suffered great costs as a result. The city of Atlanta, Georgia refused to pay a $51,000.00 ransom 
and has since paid around $17 million to recover their systems from an attack in March 2018 
(Deere 2018). Other cities have chosen to pay the ransoms to avoid the potential extraordinary 
costs of recovering from an attack. For example, the city of Riviera Beach, Florida paid a ransom 
of $600,000.00 in Bitcoins in June 2019 (Karimi 2019). Whether these cities paid a ransom or not, 
they certainly suffered from not effectively investing in cyber security. 
Smaller cities and local governments (like Colonie) have become prime targets of 
ransomware attacks. Local governments often cite a lack of budget to properly secure systems that 
provide critical community services (Gates 2019; Bond 2019). These smaller governmental bodies 
often have outdated systems and software, making them more vulnerable to attacks (Franco 
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February, 2020). One estimate places the odds of a local government falling victim to a 
ransomware attack at about one in four (Bond 2019).  
In addition to the previously mentioned high profile attacks, the leaders of the Town of 
Colonie would also have been aware of two recent attacks closer to home. On March 30th, 2019, 
the City of Albany, New York was hit by a ransomware attack which forced them to shut down 
their systems. They decided against paying the ransom because they had much of their data backed 
up. They did not release the amount of the ransom, but noted the demand changed a few times. 
Amanda Fries of the Times Union reports they ended up paying an estimated $300,000.00 to 
recover from the attack (Fries 2019). Nine months later, on Christmas day 2019, the Albany 
International Airport was hit with a ransomware attack. The airport had a backup system in place, 
but the backup shared a drive with the main system and was also compromised in the attack. Based 
on the advice from their insurance company, Michael Novinson reports the Albany County Airport 
Authority decided to pay the ransom which was above their insurance policy’s $25,000.00 
deductible but below $100,000.00. Fortunately, the hackers provided a decryption code which 
allowed them to recover their data (Novinson 2020). 
The Town of Colonie was fortunately in a better position than many of these other local 
governments. New York state has had cybersecurity as a major topic with the most proposed 
cybersecurity laws of any state between 2015-2019 (NCSL 2020). While the state has not been as 
successful at passing these laws, clearly some of the local governments have taken this issue to 
heart. The Town of Colonie realized the importance of cybersecurity as it had invested around 
$50,000.00 in a secure backup system three years prior to the ransomware attack on the town 
(Carbonite 2020; Franco February 2020). Despite fears of potentially becoming another Baltimore, 
the leaders ultimately decided to trust their backup system and IT department by refusing to pay 
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the $400,000.00 ransom demand. Using the backup system, they were able to continue to maintain 
day-to-day operations while the IT department worked extensive hours of overtime to restore their 
systems. Jim Franco of Spotlight News reports that over two weeks they brought in all 500 of the 
town’s computers to be reset with the backup (Franco February 2020). While Colonie still suffered 
some consequences, it fared far better than many other cities mentioned and likely better than it 
would have by paying the ransom.  
There is clearly great disparity in the outcomes of these examples. While many state and 
local governments have been caught under prepared, some, like the Town of Colonie, were aware 
of cyber security issues and have been working to better prepare their state and local institutions 
to the variety of cyber threats that exist. As stated before, the threat from ransomware was not 
significant until recently. While state governments have had little time to adapt to the rapidly 
emerging ransomware threat, they have been working to better prepare for cyber security issues in 
general. These efforts have clearly varied in their effectiveness. What policies have been 
successful? Has legislation on cybersecurity helped to avoid or mitigate the damage caused by 
ransomware attacks? 
 
Argument and Approach 
In spite of the enormous potential costs and consequences from ransomware attacks are 
enormous, governments have generally been slow to address cybersecurity concerns. Seventy-
eight countries have national cybersecurity strategies, but almost all of these countries created their 
strategy only after 2010, almost 20 years after the Internet was opened to the public (CSIS 2020).1  
 
1 Of course, the United States was working on these issues at least since President Clinton’s administration. 




It is difficult for governments to know how to react when there is limited knowledge both 
on the rapidly emerging threat of ransomware and on how policies can be effective to combat this 
threat. Both commercial victims and insurance companies have incentives to not report 
ransomware payouts, as they want to avoid scrutiny and protect their reputations (Dudley 2019). 
Further, while insurance is government regulated in the United States, it is regulated at the state 
level. Thus, any data collected is diffused throughout 50 different governing bodies.  
This dissertation attempts to further our understanding of the effectiveness of legislative 
approaches to combatting ransomware attacks by exploring how legislation on cyber security 
passed at the state level from 2015 through 2019 correlates with the occurrence of ransomware 
attacks on state or local institutions. I argue that legislation providing or mandating cyber security 
training should have the largest negative effect on ransomware attacks. Legislation providing or 
mandating cyber security training is likely to be one of the most important mitigating factors from 
a policy perspective. This is because ransomware attacks typically occur through phishing. The 
word is a play on fishing because the strategy used in the two acts is the same – bait and hook. In 
phishing, the bait or lure is the text and appearance of the email, which is typically modeled after 
a common company’s legitimate email and is used to trick its victim into getting hooked by 
following a link or attachment that can steal personal information or download malware, such as 
ransomware. Another common part of the lure is to create a sense of urgency by creating a false 
deadline to respond, such as stating the target’s account will be deactivated within 24 hours if no 
action is taken. Novice attempts at phishing are typically easy to spot, as the lure is riddled with 
 
We know that we have to keep cyberspace open and free. We have to make, at the same time, computer 
networks more secure and resilient, and we have to do more to protect privacy and civil liberties. And we're 
here to work together (White House at Work 2000). 
 




typos and grammatical errors. But cyber criminals have begun to excel at the art of subterfuge in 
phishing emails. Emails can be sent which appear in every way to come from legitimate 
organizations, such as banks, except that instead of coming from an @bank.org email address they 
come from @bank.com or other similar ruses. Thus, training government employees to recognize 
these threats is an increasingly important component of thwarting cybersecurity threats. 
I evaluate the evidence for a relationship between types of cyber-legislation passed and the 
amount of ransomware attacks at the state level in the United States over the period of 2015-2019. 
To measure the presence of different types of cybersecurity legislation, I use data from the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). This allows me to characterize variation in the adoption 
of cyber policies over time for all US states during the temporal domain of the study. The NCSL 
is an interstate organization whose mission “is to advance the effectiveness, independence and 
integrity of legislatures and to foster interstate cooperation and facilitate the exchange of 
information among legislatures” (NCSL 2020). One way they accomplish this is by tracking the 
legislation which has been proposed and if it has passed or failed to become law. They have tracked 
cybersecurity legislation in all 50 states, the territories, and commonwealths in the United States. 
They provide brief synopses of each law that was proposed and note if it has passed, failed, or is 
still pending. This information has to then be turned into usable data through the use of keyword 
algorithms to create variables for each type of legislation on cybersecurity. A limitation of this 
method is that it relies on the brief synopsis provided by NCSL, which may not use the same terms 
used in the actual laws and may not use the keywords in the algorithms. However, this allows a 
great deal of legislation data to be changed into a usable form.  
To measure my outcome variable, I use data on successful ransomware attacks on state and 
local institutions from StateScoop.com, whose focus is on “news and events impacting technology 
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decisions in state and local government” (Freed 2019). StateScoop have built on previous research 
to develop a database of every known public-sector ransomware attack since 2013 by compiling 
attacks which have been made public in the news.2 At the time of this writing, the total number of 
recorded attacks is 368. They track the target of the attack, strain of ransomware used, ransom 
amount demanded, and whether the victim paid or not. Unfortunately, due to the potential 
reputation costs, victims have incentives not to report attacks or to not fully report. Allan Liska 
explains, “Ransomware attacks are not always publicly reported by state and local governments 
and there is no centralized reporting authority, similar to HIPAA requirements, for these agencies” 
(Liska 2019). In some incidents were reported but the details on if the ransom was paid or how 
much was paid was not provided by the victim, likely to try to protect their reputation. Further, 
StateScoop acknowledges that smaller events, which likely occur daily throughout the country, go 
unreported (Freed 2019). This underreporting means the data only reflects a subset of attacks. In 
this case, it reflects attacks on the public sector which were large enough to be reported in the 
news. Despite this limitation, this is one of the most comprehensive data sets available on 
ransomware attacks.   
In order to test the relationship between these two variables, this study uses regression 
models. The models help show the correlation between the types of legislation, which are the 
primary independent variables, and the number of ransomware attacks by state, which is the 
dependent variable. Legislation typically takes time to develop and implement; and can sometimes 
 
2 Initially on May 13, 2019, StateScoop reported on a dataset of 169 ransomware attacks, which was compiled by 
Allan Liska from Recorded Future, a cyber security company. Liska compiled most of the dataset by reviewing local 
papers and local television news reports, as “most of these incidents are not “big enough” to be considered national 
news […] (Liska 2019). StateScoop has taken up the mantel to continue tracking ransomware attacks since Lisa’s 
initial report. I spoke with Colin Wood, the managing editor from StateScoop, on August 19, 2020. He explained 
that their first step was to contact some cybersecurity companies to try to obtain additional information on 
ransomware attacks. Since that time, they have continued to update the dataset based on local news and television 
reports. They use Google alerts, which update them as new stories are posted online. Then they sift through articles 
to compile as much information about the attack as possible to update their dataset. 
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be reactionary. For example, a state may suffer a few cyberattacks in a year leading them to enact 
legislation in reaction to these threats. To account for this, I use a lagged dependent variable in the 
regression model.  
In addition to the primary independent variables, I include five other independent variables 
as a control for the models. The first two variables are included to account for the differences in 
state population size and technology. I use the estimated average population for each state for the 
2010-2019 decade and the number of households per state with access to the Internet. I took the 
natural log of these variables to help adjust for the skew caused by states with substantially larger 
population and internet sizes. I also accounted for differences in cybersecurity budgets with a 
variable for the estimated cybersecurity expenditure per state per year. Finally, the literature 
suggests political party may have an effect on state cybersecurity. To control for this effect, I 
included a variable for the political party of the governor per state and a variable for the political 
party of the legislature. The legislature can include a varying number of seats per state and also 
includes both a house and senate per state, which can all have more subtleties than a variable which 
reflects the simple majority. To account for these subtleties, I used the percent of the total 
legislature that was either Republican or Democrat. 
The initial models provide mixed results on the effects of state cybersecurity legislation on 
the number of ransomware attacks. When I analyze data from the whole 2015-2019 period, a 
number of cybersecurity legislation variables which are statistically significant, but in the opposite 
direction expected. Instead of a negative relationship with the number of ransomware attacks, these 
variables show a positive effect. However, when I isolate 2019 and test for the effects of all 
cybersecurity legislation from the preceding years on the number of ransomware attacks in 2019, 
the results provide evidence that state cybersecurity legislation can have a negative effect on the 
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number of ransomware attacks. In particular, state cybersecurity laws on data breaches have a 
negative relationship ransomware attacks. The reasons for the mixed results could be due to the 
great changes occurring during this timeframe. The initial period was a reactionary period as 
ransomware switched from indiscriminate attacks to targeted attacks against state and local 
institutions, while state governments on average increasingly became more active in enacting 
cybersecurity legislation. Then by 2019, the results of these laws began to take shape and states 
which had enacted more cybersecurity legislation, especially if focused on data breaches, tended 
to have less ransomware attacks.  
 
Study Context 
Research on the efficacy of legislation mandating or providing cyber security training to 
prevent or mitigate ransomware attacks is critically needed as the issue is quickly becoming a 
crisis. As mentioned, the United States alone likely suffered more than $7.5 billion in damages 
caused by ransomware in 2019 (Emsisoft 2020), up from an estimated $325 million in 2015 
(Morgan 2018). The speed of this increase in cyber extortion has been matched only by an 
explosion of growth in cyber insurance. Renee Dudley reports, “between 2015 and 2017, total U.S. 
cyber premiums written by insurers that reported to the NAIC doubled to an estimated $3.1 billion” 
(Dudley 2019). Instead of solving this issue, cyber insurance appears to be part of the problem. 
According to Dudley, since insurance companies are willing to pay ransoms, more ransomware 
attacks are committed and, inevitably, more companies are purchasing cyber insurance to manage 
their risk (Dudley 2019). Thus, the cost of ransomware attacks appears likely to continue to 
increase becoming more of a threat to the global economy.  
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The costs of ransomware are not only monetary. Commercial or governmental victims can 
suffer extensive down time, delays, and reputational costs. The average number of days of 
downtime due to a ransomware attack rose to 16.2 days in the last quarter of 2019 (Siegel 2020). 
That is over half a month of potential lost revenue for businesses or lost services for government 
institutions. Siegel (2020) explains the increase is due to a high rate of attacks on larger enterprises 
and a new tactic used by some ransomware perpetrators. “In Q4 Ryuk[, a strain of ransomware,] 
actors began using a “Wake-on-Lan” feature to turn on devices within a compromised network 
that were initially powered off” (Siegel 2020). In other words, once infected with ransomware the 
program forces systems that are off to be powered back on and become infected, increasing the 
scope of the attack.  
Downtime and delays can occur whether the ransom is paid or not, even if the victim has 
proper backups in place. As previously discussed, the attack on the Town of Colonie was relatively 
inexpensive. The town refused to pay the ransom because it had backup systems in place, which 
their IT staff was able to use to recover their systems. However, even a city as well prepared as 
the Town of Colonie had service issues and down time until the IT department was able to finish 
implementing the recovery of their 500 affected computers around two weeks later (Franco 
February 2020). Likewise, the ill-prepared city of Baltimore, had down time equivalent to the 
severity of the attack, which infected over 10,000 computers, and their lack of preparedness by not 
having backups in place. It took over a month to restore all city employee’s email systems and 
around three months before they were finally able to distribute water bills (Chokshi 2019).  
While down time and delays can be costly and frustrating, reputational costs of falling 
victim to a ransomware attack can lead to additional financial consequences due to loss of business 
and customers. One survey found that 59% of people would likely avoid using an organization that 
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experienced a cyberattack and 58% would leave a business affected by 2 or fewer attacks (Whitney 
2020). Though these figures are based on hypothetical responses, consumers’ actual reactions to 
real attacks generally align with survey results. In 2013, Target suffered a data breach of 
customers’ personal information. Target’s reputation plummeted soon after from a brand index 
rating on consumer perception of 20.7 in 2013 down to 9.4 in 2014 (Hospelhorn 2020). 
Reputation is not only important for commercial victims, but also governmental victims. 
Government officials who are in charge when a ransomware attack occurs can suffer reputation 
costs and even potentially lose their position. For example, the IT manager in Lake City, FL was 
fired after the city suffered a ransomware attack. The attack ended with the city’s insurer paying a 
ransom of around $460,000 and the city had to spend additional time and money to recover data 
which was lost in the attack (Robles 2019). Further, elected officials will undoubtedly see political 
opponents highlight preventive failures in future elections.  
Ransomware is also evolving into a national security threat. Some forms of ransomware 
have changed from indiscriminate, blanket attacks to well planned, targeted attacks increasing in 
potential societal costs. Healthcare, law enforcement, and local government are being increasingly 
targeted. These institutions provide critical services. The criminals are focusing on these types of 
actors because these actors feel increased pressure to pay the ransom as often they need their 
computer systems as a matter of life or death. Further these entities are also typically at higher risk 
as their systems are more susceptible to attack. Healthcare facilities were allocated government 
funds to encourage the use of electronic health records increasing use of these records from 9.4 
percent in 2008 to 96.9 percent in 2014. This rapid digitization of health records was not followed 
by a similar increase in IT infrastructure and resources, as no government funds were allocated for 
such measures. Thus, the rapid increase in IT utilization has left many healthcare facilities exposed 
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and vulnerable to cyber security threats (Spence, et al. 2018). In fact, in 2020 two ransomware 
attacks on healthcare facilities made global news due to the severity of the outcomes. An attack on 
Universal Health Services Inc., a company with over 250 hospitals throughout the US, forced 
facilities nationwide to use paper backups causing delays and potentially diverting patients 
elsewhere (Bajak 2020). Worse yet, a ransomware attack on Dusseldorf University Hospital may 
be responsible for the death of a patient. The attack disabled computer systems forcing a patient in 
need of critical care to undergo a lengthy transport to another hospital 19 miles away where she 
later died (Tidy 2020). With lives on the line, the decision for these institutions to pay or not pay 
a ransom are truly dire and a serious attack could create a national security crisis. 
Another target with national security implications and potentially devastating societal costs 
is the election infrastructure. These venues are prime targets for ransomware attacks because they 
are manned by local authorities, who have varying levels of cybersecurity competency, and an 
approaching election creates an urgency to recover a system quickly in the event of an attack. 
“[A]dversaries also recognize that government cannot afford to shut down, especially during a 
contentious election season, and that a fallback to manual processes would be unacceptable. With 
so much at stake, it would be a difficult choice whether or not to pay the ransom” (Moore 2019). 
Even if a manual process could be implemented to count the votes, the reputational costs would 
be potentially enormous as doubt would be cast a cloud over the election results (Tucker, et al. 
2020).  These fears are not unwarranted: Florida had been a victim of a ransomware attack in 2016 
only weeks before the election (Flores 2020). Further, ransomware criminals were active during 
the 2020 US election cycle by ‘spamming’ fake political campaign emails, tricking unsuspecting 
victims into downloading ransomware when they tried to unsubscribe (Solomon 2020).  
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There are further potential national security consequences of failing to act preventively on 
ransomware from both state and non-state actors. There is evidence some state actors have begun 
developing and spreading ransomware as an offensive cyber-weapon. For example, in 2017 two 
strains of ransomware were released with devastating effects around the world. First, the 
WannaCry ransomware strain quickly “infected over 300,000 computers in over 150 countries” 
(KnowBe4 2020). The attack is believed to have come from North Korea using an exploit stolen 
from the NSA (Trautman and Ormerod 2018). Later that year, it is believed Russia developed the 
NotPetya ransomware strain to attack Ukraine. However, similar to the WannaCry strain, the 
ransomware quickly spread beyond Ukraine around the globe (Trautman and Ormerod 2018; 
Palmer 2019). Disturbingly, it appears that unlike most previous ransomware this strain was 
developed not as a financial motivation, but solely as a weapon of cyber-destruction. The NotPetya 
strain was designed to encrypt the victim’s files and then essentially throw away the key, 
potentially destroying the data forever (KnowBe4 2020). The WannaCry3 and NotPetya4 strain 
caused billions of dollars of damages worldwide, demonstrating the threat of state developed 
ransomware.  
There are also national security concerns regarding non-state actors’ use of ransomware. 
There are fears that paid ransoms could potentially fund terrorism. While there have been no 
confirmed reports of ransomware payments going to terrorists, many fear that terrorist groups 
could be utilizing this method as a source of financing as there is often no way of identifying the 
source of the attack (Blannin 2018). Others fear that terrorists could attempt a largescale 
ransomware attack (Acharya 2017), with some estimates advising “[it] could cost the global 
 
3 The WannaCry ransomware attack caused an estimated $4 billion in damages worldwide (Reinsurance News 
2017). 
4 The NotPetya ransomware caused an estimated $10 billion or more in damages around the world. In fact, as few 
as nine companies lost and estimated $1.8 billion due to this ransomware strain (Tehrani 2017). 
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economy $193 billion and impact more than 600,000 businesses worldwide” (Chung 2019). 
Despite these fears, the US Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency believes that terrorists 
do not currently have the “computer network capabilities and propensity to pursue cyber means.” 
Yet, they do acknowledge the threat of cyberterrorism may increase in the future as the younger, 
more technologically savvy generation could join terrorist organizations (CISA 2020).  
While grand cyber-attacks may be beyond terrorist organizations’ reach, the threat of a 
terrorist led ransomware attack is not as farfetched given the ease of entry into this form of 
cybercrime. Ransomware has developed into a service economy for aspiring criminals who may 
not have sophisticated programming skills. Indeed, “a basic appeal of ransomware is simple: it’s 
turnkey. Unlike many other forms of cyberattacks, ransomware can be quickly and brainlessly 
deployed with a high probability of profit” (Singh et al. 2017). Ransomware as a service (RaaS) is 
a term used to describe the illicit economic activity between ransomware creators and purchasers. 
The creators sell their ransomware to buyers for a fee and then often take a portion of the ransoms 
acquired, as well.  Meland, et al. (2020) explain that “RaaS can have different formats, such as 
source code that the buyer compiles himself, pre-compiled binaries or an interface where the buyer 
inputs information about the victims. This collaborative strategy is a way of achieving a faster rate 
of infections with a lower risk of getting caught” (Meland, et al. 2020). In other words, would be 
criminals, including terrorists, can easily enter the market to obtain and then spread ransomware. 
With this risk in mind, governments need to take actions now to make sure they are properly 
prepared to avoid inadvertently funding terrorism while victim to a ransomware attack. 
 In sum, ransomware is clearly enormously costly. The financial costs of either paying the 
ransom or recovering from an attack have been high, especially in the case of the City of Baltimore. 
Yet, even cities which are better prepared, such as the Town of Colonie, can suffer delays and 
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downtime of critical infrastructure. The reputational costs can lead to lost business and erode trust 
in the organization. A lack of credibility can be potentially disastrous for an election. Finally, these 
costs are part of a criminal economy which is encouraging further ransomware attacks and 
potentially funding terrorist activities. Therefore, the issue of ransomware is critical and 
understanding how to effectively prevent it is only becoming more important. However, the 
efficacy of different policy tools remains poorly understood. Understanding whether and how 
legislation and policies are helping to deter or thwart ransomware attacks against state and local 
government institutions will inform policy makers’ efforts to fight this emerging threat.  
 
Outline 
 This dissertation consists of seven chapters, including this introductory chapter. In Chapter 
II, I summarize and synthesize the existing literature on legislation and cyber threats. This review 
is critical as a foundation for this study. It not only helps in understanding how legislation has and 
will affect ransomware, but also demonstrates how this study builds upon the current body of 
knowledge.   
 Chapter III presents my theoretical argument about how and when cybersecurity legislation 
should be effective at combatting ransomware. Chapter III builds on the previous chapter by 
directly tying existing theories to the research question I investigate here – what policies are most 
effective against ransomware? I examine ransomware strategies in more detail to understand what 
strategies cybersecurity experts recommend to combat ransomware and assess their potential 
effectiveness. Based on these recommendations, I argue that legislation providing or mandating 
cyber security training should have the largest negative effect on ransomware attacks. This is 
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because ransomware attacks typically occur due to human error from falling victim to phishing, 
which could be prevented with proper training.  
 In Chapter IV I examine how states have varied in their policy approaches to cybersecurity 
and present descriptive trends in cybersecurity legislation. This chapter explores what types of 
specific issues cybersecurity legislation has addressed and the frequency with which proposed 
legislation becomes law using a database of  cybersecurity legislation at the state level from 2015-
2019 from the National Conference of State Legislatures. 
 In Chapter V I outline a research design to analyze when and how cybersecurity legislation 
has deterred ransomware attacks and report the results of my analysis. I combine the data explored 
in Chapter IV with data on successful ransomware attacks on state and local institutions from 
StateScoop.com (Freed 2019).  
 Chapter VI builds on the previous chapter by exploring case studies of the legislation which 
the model indicates may have a negative impact on ransomware attacks. These laws are explained 
in more detail to better understand the mechanisms which may be helping them to prevent 
ransomware attacks. 
 Chapter VII concludes with outlining policy prescriptions for how states should approach 
future legislation. This section hopefully can serve as a guide for legislators to help state and local 
institutions better prepare for the rapidly emerging threat of ransomware. I also propose potential 







 This chapter explores the broader literature on cybersecurity legislation to illustrate how 
this dissertation adds to the prior body of knowledge and to answer the following questions: Why 
has there been a relative lack of policy and research on cybersecurity? What factors have pushed 
cybersecurity concerns to the sidelines? The short answer is that politicians, and society in general, 
are often slow to adapt to technological changes (Moor 1985). To explore these issues further, I 
first examine the definitions of cybercrime. Then in the second section, I briefly examine the 
history of cybercrime in general to show the trends and how ransomware has recently emerged as 
a significant cybersecurity threat. The third section provides a brief history of cybersecurity 
legislation in the United States to provide insight into how the United States has attempted to 
address cybercrimes. Finally, in section four I review the literature on the effectiveness of 
cybersecurity legislation at combatting cybercrime. This review provides the foundation to then 
review cybersecurity legislation’s effect on ransomware in the following chapter and developing 
the argument that legislation mandating or providing training should have the largest negative 
effect on ransomware attacks. 
 
Defining Cybercrime 
 The information age took off with the spread of the Internet in the 1990s which brought 
significant benefits to global communications and commerce. Some people, such as Barlow 
(1996), even believed the Internet would be a virtual utopia free from the vices of the real world.5 
 
5 “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” was written in 1996 by John Perry Barlow, who imagined the 
Internet would be a utopia. He is a founding member of Electronic Frontier Foundation a nonprofit organization 
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However, the opportunity and freedom offered by the Internet were also available to would be 
criminals, who quickly capitalized on the lack of governance and the anonymity the Internet can 
provide. What was old became new again, as cybercriminals brought ancient vices, such as theft, 
fraud, and vandalism, onto the Internet firmly cementing a new era of cybercrime. 
Defining cybercrime is complex as the term encompasses a wide variety of criminal acts 
and behaviors (Jane and Martellozzo 2017; Sarre, et al. 2018). Cybercrime can include crimes, 
such as theft, that have always occurred in the real world, but are now also taking place online. 
Yet, the term can also include other crimes, such as sextortion6, which occur only in the digital 
world and have no clear real-world parallels (Jane and Martellozzo 2017). Many criminals now 
utilize the internet to facilitate more traditional criminal acts, such as drug trafficking (Jane and 
Martellozzo 2017; Sarre, et al. 2018). Still other crimes, such as stalking, bullying, and domestic 
violence, can often simultaneously occur offline but the Internet and other emerging technologies 
amplify the “abuse, harassment, and coercion” (Jane and Martellozo 2017).  
To include this wide range of acts and behaviors, scholars have tried to breakdown 
cybercrime in various ways to make it more manageable. Gordon and Ford (2006) define 
cybercrime as a continuous scale between Type I, which is crime that relies on technical skills like 
hacking, and Type II, which relies more on social interaction such as cyberbullying. Most acts fall 
somewhere in between utilizing both technical and social aspects, such as phishing. This ambiguity 
 
whose goal is to defend civil liberties in the digital world. In the essay, he argues that governments should stay out 
of cyberspace as the digital community is creating a “civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace,” which “all may enter 
without privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth” (Barlow 1996). 
Further, he believed the Internet would be a place where anyone could express their beliefs and “legal concepts of 
property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply” (Barlow 1996).  
6 Jane and Martellozzo (2017) define sextortion as “an emerging criminal practice in which perpetrators gain remote 
access to computers to obtain intimate or compromising footage of targets who are then blackmailed into performing 
sex acts (thereby becoming entrapped even further).” While the crime includes aspects of some traditional crimes, it 
does not fit easily into any one category. They explain “Sextortion, for instance, can involve elements of stalking, 
home invasion, theft, blackmail, pedophilia, domestic violence, sexual exploitation, harassment, and abuse, and 
organised crime” (Jane and Martellozzo 2017).  
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still makes it difficult to classify acts as it is difficult to measure how technical versus social some 
crimes may be.  
Another approach tries to give cybercrime a more clear definition by breaking cybercrime 
into three main categories: targeting a computer, using the computer as the instrument to commit 
a crime, and using the computer to help facilitate the crime (Clifford 2001; Grabosky and Walkley 
2007; Khadam 2012). Clifford (2001, page 15) explains, 
Cybercrimes are often characterized as falling into three categories: crimes in which the 
computer is the target of the criminal activity; crimes in which the computer is a tool used 
to commit a crime; and crimes in which the use of the computer is an incidental aspect of 
the commission of the crime. (Clifford 2001, page 15) 
 
In other words the first category, where the computer is the target, can include crimes such as 
hacking or malware. The second category focuses on the computer as a tool which is necessary to 
commit the crime, such as digital fraud or cyber espionage. Finally the third category is the use of 
a computer as part of a crime as one of a few options, such as illicit drug sales which could have 
also been done over the phone or in person (Clifford 2001). This system certainly helps to clarify 
the criminal acts but is hindered by its rigid classification which cannot account for many of the 
subtleties of cybercrime that can cross all of the categories, such as sextortion. 
 A third approach is to focus on how technology is involved in the crime, but in a less rigid 
way from the second definition. McGuire and Dowling (2013) break cybercrime into two 
categories: cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent. Cyber-enabled crimes are enhanced or assisted by 
the Internet (McGuire and Dowling 2013). This category would include both cyberbullying, which 
is amplified by computers and the Internet (Jane and Martellozzo 2017), and drug-trafficking, 
which can be done more easily with the aid of the Internet (Sarre, et al. 2018). On the other hand, 
cyber-dependent crimes require computers and the Internet (McGuire and Dowling 2013).  Crimes 
in this category include hacktivism and malware (Sarre, et al. 2018).  
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 Each definition certainly has limitations, yet these definitions offer lenses to view 
ransomware, which is the focus of this dissertation. Ransomware will be reviewed in more detail 
later, but this form of cybercrime can have both a highly technical and a human interaction side so 
it would oscillate depending on the ransomware strain somewhere around the middle of Gordon 
and Ford’s (2006) scale. Clifford (2001), Grabosky and Walkley (2007) and Khadam (2012) would 
have a difficult time placing ransomware as it has aspects which involve the computer as the target 
of the criminal activity, such as the malware encryption, but also involves the computer as the 
instrument used in the crime, such as through phishing and extortion. Finally, most ransomware 
would certainly fall under McGuire and Dowling’s (2013) cyber-dependent category, as a 
computer is necessary for the malware and encryption aspects of ransomware. However, some of 
the less sophisticated forms of ransomware, such as fake anti-virus scams, could be seen as cyber-
enabled (McGuire and Dowling 2013) as they could potentially be carried out offline as well. 
While none of these definitions can pinpoint ransomware exactly, they provide a backdrop that 
will be used to help determine the best methods to counteract this rapidly emerging form of 
cybercrime.  
 
Brief History of Cybercrime 
 Since this dissertation focuses on ransomware, this review will focus only cybercrime that 
is similarly cyber-dependent. The struggle defining cybercrime shows that the term certainly 
encompasses a wide variety of criminal activity. In fact, one of the earliest acts considered a 
cybercrime dates back to 1834 when the French Telegraph System was “hack[ed … to] steal 
financial market information” (Herjavec 2019). Criminals have continued to evolve with the times 
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as attacks switched from telegraphs to telephones.7 Then, as computers were developed, criminals 
soon followed. In 1969 the first virus disabled a computer at the University of Washington 
Computer Center. Then in 1970 one of the first cybercriminal sprees was begun by Kevin Mitnick, 
who tricked employees at Nokia and Motorola into providing him codes and passwords so he could 
access internal computer systems. Despite the lengthy history of cyber related crimes, the first 
person to be convicted specifically of a cybercrimes was Ian Murphy in 1981 when he hacked into 
AT&T’s network (Herjavec 2019). Criminals clearly have evolved with technology. 
To help understand this evolution, it is useful to view cybercrime through the lens of 
globalization. There is no consensus on the definition of globalization in the literature (Scholte 
2005), but the focus of this dissertation is on changes in governance due to the emerging 
cybersecurity threat of ransomware. Due to this focus, globalization in this dissertation is defined 
in terms of respatialization or the process of deterritorializing social relations due to the increase 
in transplanetary connections (Scholte 2005). In other words, state boundaries and even geographic 
location matter less due to the increase in the speed of travel and communications which allow 
people located anywhere on the planet to interact instantaneously.  
According to many scholars, respatialization has consequences for governance (Rosenau 
2003; Scholte 2005). The increase in transplanetary connections have made states ill-equipped to 
deal with the issues highlighted by the dark side of globalization. Rosenau (2003) argues that the 
increase in these transplanetary connections, or as he calls them “distant proximities,”8 has led to 
fragmegration or simultaneous processes of fragmenting and integrating across all levels of 
 
7 For example in 1878, only two years after its invention, teenagers were disrupting phone calls by “repeatedly and 
intentionally misdirecting and disconnecting customer calls” (Herjavec 2019). Later in 1955, David Condon was 
able to trick the phone system by whistling songs that caused the system to allow him to make calls to any phone 
number in the world for free (Herjavec 2019).  
8 Rosenau (2003) describes respatialization as an increase in “distant proximities,” which oxymoronically implies 
that what happens far away has effects close by and vice versa (Rosenau 2003). 
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governance (Rosenau 2003). Fragmegration has also led to crises of authority at all levels of 
governance creating gaps which are not necessarily filled automatically by a different level of 
authority (Rosenau 2003).  Rosenau elaborates, “[I]t is otherwise likely that the diminution of state 
authority throughout the world has led not only to a shift of authority to other collectivities but 
also to vacuums of authority, to situations in such disarray as to be lacking any centers of authority” 
(Rosenau 2003). These vacuums or gaps in authority and governance have led rise to the “dark 
side of globalization,” which includes global terrorism, drug trade, and cybercrime (Heine 2011).  
The early incidents of cybercrime certainly have evidence of this deterritorializing, 
fragmegration process. Schneier (2018) explains the criminals who hacked the French Telegraph 
System were the Blanc brothers, who were stock traders. At the time, information on the stock 
market was transported by mail coach from Paris to Bordeaux. The mail coach was slow and took 
several days. Many traders tried to obtain information ahead of time by using messengers or carrier 
pigeons to get an advantage in the stock trade. The Blanc brothers realized that to obtain the 
information they wanted they no longer had to physically move the messages from Paris to 
Bordeaux. Instead, they bribed a telegraph operator “to introduce deliberate errors into routine 
government messages being sent over the network” (Schneier 2018). These errors were codes that 
the Blanc brothers interpreted to gain an edge in the market. When their scheme was uncovered in 
1836, the brothers were not convicted as there was no laws against misusing the telegraph network 
(Schneier 2018).  In other words, the technology of the telegraph allowed for the 
deterritorialization by decreasing the need for physical messengers and increasing the speed and 
distance of communication. This advancement also created a crisis of governance over the use (or 
misuse) of this new technology which was not yet regulated. 
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To solve these problems of authority and governance, Scholte explains, “Authority has 
become increasingly ‘multi-level’ or ‘multi-scalar’” (Scholte 2005). Some problems are now better 
addressed at the local level, while others can be better handled at the transnational level. Similarly, 
Rosenau argues that governance must become “as complex as its environment” (Rosenau 2003). 
He suggests a new form of governance, which he calls “mobius-web governance,” that, like 
Scholte suggests, includes sub-state and supra-state entities (Rosenau 2003). Unlike Scholte’s 
suggestion, Rosenau’s system is far more complex and takes the shape of a web as opposed to the 
more traditional hierarchical forms of governance (Rosenau 2003). Yet, they both point out the 
need for a restructuring of governance due to respatialization.  
Respatialization has only increased with the exponential spread of the Internet starting in 
1989, which has allowed the communication to truly become transplanetary through the creation 
of the digital world – cyberspace. As mentioned previously, cyber-dependent crime quickly 
followed behind. Many of the early Internet crimes were essentially Internet vandalism where 
budding hackers or “cyber-vandals” could show off their skills to the nascent underground hacker 
community (CR 2017).9 These pranks quickly gave way to more serious crimes as ecommerce and 
ebanking emerged creating avenues for illicit financial gains through digital theft. For example in 
1994, a Russian software engineer, Vladimir Levin, hacked Citibank and stole $10 million. 
Another example comes from Max Butler, who used malware to steal “millions of credit card 
numbers and [make] around $86 million of fraudulent purchases” (Herjavec 2019).  
 
9 CR (2017) explains that many of these early hackers just wanted to create notoriety and maybe get a few laughs. 
They often took over or defaced websites with comical images to impress other hackers. “One infamous example 
from this period is the MS Blaster virus, also known colloquially as the ‘LoveSan’ virus. The virus forced the 
system to restart after 60 seconds and included two hidden messages in the code: ‘I just want to say LOVE YOU 
SAN!!’ and ‘Billy Gates why do you make this possible? Stop making money and fix your software!!’” (CR 2017). 
Another infamous example was the 1999 attack on the White House’s website. The hacker defaced the site with “red 
graffiti stating “Hacker wuz Here” (Alexander 2007).  
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Other cybercriminals sought to breach government and businesses’ networks to steal data 
containing personal information, such as social security and credit card numbers, and proprietary 
information, such as research and technology, to use or sell on the black market. Breaches can 
occur through hacking, phishing, theft, inside jobs, or negligence. While data breaches have 
occurred for some time, the most significant ones began occurring since 2005 as most companies 
had converted to electronic records by that time. The number of breaches per year has been 
increasing overtime. Some of the notable breaches were AOL had 92 million records compromised 
in 2005, Heartland had 130 million compromised in 2009, Sony had 77 million records 
compromised in 2010, Target had 70 million records compromised in 2013, and Yahoo had one 
billion records compromised in 2016 (De Groot 2019).  
When these breaches target proprietary information they can be considered cyber 
espionage. For example in 1998, the Moonlight Maze operation targeted American military 
technologies. Thousands of documents were stolen when hackers infiltrated the Wright Patterson 
Air Force Base. While Russia was blamed, there was not enough proof available to pursue them 
(Paganini 2017). Another notable example is the Night Dragon operation conducted by Chinese 
hackers, who targeted European and American energy companies. The hackers were able to steal 
maps with locations for potential oil reserves (Paganini 2017).  
At the same time, criminals began creating computer viruses and malicious software or 
malware, sometimes for the sole purpose of destruction. The first major virus outbreak was in 
1988. Robert Morris of MIT intended to measure the size of the internet but instead created the 
first worm and first denial-of-service (DoS) attack (SentinelOne 2019; Townsend 2019).10 “[The 
 
10 A denial-of-service (DoS) attack prevents users from accessing “systems, devices, or other network resources” 
(CISA 2019). A DoS attack is caused by “flooding the targeted host or network with traffic until the target cannot 
respond or simply crashes” (CISA 2019). 
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program] replicated so aggressively that the early internet slowed to a crawl, causing untold 
damage” (SentinelOne 2019). The 1990’s saw the growth of anti-virus software. Initially there 
were less than a hundred thousand malware samples, but these numbers quickly rose to around 
five million in 2007. “By 2014, it was estimated that around 500,000 unique malware samples 
were being produced every day” (SentinelOne 2019).  
This rise in malicious software led to some significant attacks. One of the most notorious 
was the ILOVEYOU worm, which infected millions systems around the world only hours after its 
initial release (Townsend 2019). Ogu, et al. (2020) explain the 2000 ILOVEYOU malware 
outbreak “infected about 10% of the global internet-connected computers, caused the global 
economy damages of up to $8 billion, with an added $15 billion estimated as the cost for removing 
the malware” (Ogu, et al. 2020). Yet, the legal charges against the two young Filipino programmers 
responsible for these attacks were dropped because of the “the absence of effective trans-national 
legislation” (Ogu, et al. 2020). In other words, just like the example of Blanc brothers in 1834 
France, there was a gap in authority and governance due to this new technology, which was 
exploited on a transplanetary level by the ILOVEYOU virus.  
With so many devastating cybercrimes, it may seem that governments are powerless to 
fight the dark side of globalization.  However, some scholars, such as Krasner (2001) and Hastings 
(2010), argue that the state is still capable and may actually be better equipped to deal with issues 
due to globalization. Krasner (2001) explains, “Technological changes over the last 200 years have 
increased the flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas – but the problems posed by such 
movements are not new. In many ways, states are better able to respond now than they were in the 
past” (Krasner 2001). Krasner supports his argument by citing the difference in state capacity to 
control the negative effects of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s to the Great Depression 
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(Krasner 2001). Similarly, Hastings (2010) argues that while it is easier for people, including illicit 
groups, to move and communicate across borders in a globalized world, the technologies and 
infrastructure are still, to a large part, controlled by states (Hastings 2010). This control is 
especially evident at “chokepoints, such as international airports.” In other words, states still 
control the infrastructure of globalization which gives them enough power to overcome the new 
threats, such as global terrorism, highlighted by the dark side of globalization. 
A rapidly emerging threat from the dark side of globalization certainly is putting states’ 
capacity to the test. Ransomware is in many ways a combination of three previously mentioned 
major issues: data breaches, malware, and theft (through extortion). Ransomware is a type of 
malicious software or malware which after infecting a computer tries to extort the victim 
(Hernandez-Castro, et al. 2020). While the idea has been around for some time, it took the diffusion 
of sophisticated encryption technology and the development of cryptocurrency, such as Bitcion, 
for this cybercrime to truly take off (Hampton and Baig 2015). When these developments came 
together in 2013 they took ransomware from a minor nuisance to a global threat costing the global 
economy billions each year (Emsisoft 2020). For example, in 2017 the WannaCry ransomware 
strain infected around 300,000 computers throughout the world and caused losses around $4 billion 
(Reinsurance News 2017).  
Certainly, Krasner (2001) and Hastings (2010) line of thinking could be used to help 
explain ransomware attacks prior to 2013. Ransomware attacks prior to that time were more of a 
nuisance that cost victims usually around a few hundred dollars an attack (Keizer 2011; Savage, 
et al. 2015; Scott-Cowley 2017). In part, these low ransom demands were due to a lack of a secure, 
scalable payment method (Hampton and Baig 2015). While larger ransoms could have been 
demanded through wire payments, the criminals understood if they drew too much attention the 
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police could become involved and use traditional means of tracing wire payments and freezing 
bank accounts. Thus, the state, like Hastings (2010) argues, had control of the ‘chokepoints’ 
through the financial institutions.  
However, with the rise of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin in 2009, ransomware criminals 
found they could retain their anonymity and request higher ransoms by demanding the ransom be 
paid in cryptocurrency, which is very difficult if not impossible to trace. This change allowed 
ransomware criminals to change their targets to businesses and other enterprises. They have also 
been steadily increasing their demands with some, as noted above, now in the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. Ransomware is quickly becoming one of the most significant cyber threats. 
It is therefore critical that this threat be studied so that proper countermeasures can be taken to stop 
ransomware from continuing to grow.  
 
Brief History of Cybersecurity Legislation in the US 
The rapidly emerging threat of ransomware is an aspect of the dark side of globalization 
which requires a restructuring of authority at the national, subnational, and supranational levels. 
However, this threat has only become relevant recently with little time for governments to react. 
Yet, ransomware shares many characteristics with other, more longstanding cybercrimes, such as 
data breaches, malware, and digital theft. The government has had more time to react to these other 
cybercrimes, which has led to the passage of several cybersecurity laws. Still these laws took years 
to be passed and were still considered by many to be insufficient in addressing cybersecurity 
concerns. “Cybersecurity law in the United States,” explains Kosseff (2017), “currently is a 
patchwork of outdated privacy and computer crime laws” (Kosseff 2017). At the same time, 
cybercrime, as made clear in the above section, became a significant threat to the global economy. 
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The first section explores the reason for the delays and lack of comprehensive legislation on 
cybersecurity in the United States. The second section then discusses the history of cybersecurity 
legislation at the federal level. Then I examine how the federal legislation has been supplemented 
at the supranational and subnational (state) levels in the third and fourth sections.  
 
Policy Vacuum 
To better understand the history of cybersecurity legislation in the United States, this 
section will first attempt to answer the following questions: Why has the passage of cybersecurity 
legislation taken so long when cybercrime has developed so quickly? Why has there been a relative 
lack of policy and research on cybersecurity? What factors have pushed cybersecurity concerns to 
the sidelines? The short answer is that politicians, and society in general, are often slow to adapt 
to technological changes. Moor (1985) explains that new technology (e.g., computers) creates a 
policy vacuum by raising practical and ethical question about its use that cannot be answered until 
it is clear how it is being used, as the potential applications of a technology are often unknown at 
its inception (Moor 1985). 
The automobile, invented in 1885 by Karl Benz, provides a convenient example of how 
technological innovation can create policy vacuums and how societies may be slow to adapt to 
new technologies. At first, only the wealthy were able to acquire cars, yet property damage, 
injuries, and even deaths from automobile accidents were quickly a problem. In Great Britain, 
police were already attempting to deal with overcrowded and dangerous streets due to increased 
traffic of carts, carriages, horses, and the recent invention of the bicycle, which youth were 
“furiously – ‘scorching’ – through towns and cities” (Emsley 1993). The addition of the 
automobile made these issues worse and were far more dangerous. In 1913, less than 30 years after 
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automobiles were invented, there were already 4,200 motor-vehicle deaths per year in the United 
States (Injury Facts 2020), while in England and Wales there 38,050 non-fatal accidents and 1,743 
fatal-accidents (Emsley 1993). These numbers only continued to rise until 1972 when deaths from 
motor-vehicle accidents in the United States peaked at over 56,000 (Injury Facts 2020). 
Despite the clear dangers of automobiles, legislation on the subject was slow to arrive. 
There was little legislation for the British police officer to use to regulate the “furious driving” that 
was causing mayhem on the roads.11 The chief constable of Huntingtonshire reported that drivers 
often refused to stop when signaled by police, provided false identification, had faster vehicles 
than the police, and would often attempt to bribe the constables (Emsley 1993). It was not until 
1903 when Britain introduce the Motor Car Act, which brought about some regulation, most 
notably the introduction of driver’s licenses (Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency 2020).  
Similarly, Dedrick (2020) explains that “the early traffic years of the twentieth-century 
were lawless. […] there were absolutely no street signs, street lights, road laws, traffic signals, 
brake lights, drunk driving laws, the list goes on. The streets were complete chaos” (Dedrick 2020). 
In the United States the first statewide speed limit was established in Connecticut in May, 1901 
(History.com Editors 2009).12 Legislation continued slowly over the next two decades as traffic 
signs and signals were slowly implemented.13 The first stop light was introduced in 1914, but took 
 
11 Clive Emsley explains the British police officers had only the “1896 Locomotives on Highways Act, which had 
made it lawful to drive self-propelled vehicles of less than three tons on the roads without a man in front carrying a 
red flag.” This law was intended for traction engines and was not useful for regulating motor-vehicle drivers (Emsley 
1993). 
12 The law passed in Connecticut in 1901 limited speed for motor vehicles to 12 mph in cities and 15 mph on country 
roads. Prior to this some local laws were in effect, but primarily codes relating to non-motor vehicles were utilized. 
“In 1652, the colony of New Amsterdam (now New York) issued a decree stating that “[N]o wagons, carts or sleighs 
shall be run, rode or driven at a gallop” at the risk of incurring a fine starting at “two pounds Flemish,” or about $150 
in today’s currency” (History.com Editors 2009). 
13 History.com Editors explain that “the first traffic island was put into use in San Francisco, California in 1907; left-
hand drive became standard in American cars in 1908; the first center painted dividing line appeared in 1911, in 
Michigan; and the first “No Left Turn” sign would debut in Buffalo, New York, in 1916 (History.com Editors 2009). 
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another decade to become commonplace in many larger cities (Stromberg 2015). It was not until 
the 1950s that factory installed seatbelts started appearing in cars. In 1968, the Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standard took effect, which required manufacturers to install seat belts in all vehicles 
(Donaldson 2019). So, it took just over 80 years from the creation of the automobile to the 
legislation requiring seat belts in cars even though fatal accidents were steadily rising throughout 
this period.  
 
Federal Level Legislation 
Clearly, society and politicians can take an exceedingly long time to adjust to new 
technological innovations and fill in the policy vacuum (Moor 1985), even when lives are on the 
line. Similarly, the policy vacuum issue has affected cybersecurity legislation. Computer 
technology had been improving and diffusing throughout the United States since the 1950s. Yet, 
the first law to address concerns of crime affecting or using computers was not passed until the 
mid-1980s before the spread of the Internet.  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was 
passed in 1984 and had further revisions in 1986, 1996, 2001 (Alexander 2007), and 2008 
(Flowers, et al. 2013). The focus of the law was to criminalize certain acts that targeted government 
and (later) financial institutions’ computers. It specifically prohibits “transmission of a program, 
information, code, or command” that causes damage to a computer or computer program, which 
makes the distribution of malware and other cybercrimes illegal (Alexander 2007). Flowers, et al. 
(2013) explains, “[The CFAA] is the most significant law to date in the US to address 
cybersecurity. [… However,] such laws have little effect on individuals, groups, or governments 
over whom the US lacks – or is unable to secure – regulatory or criminal jurisdiction” (Flowers, 
et al. 2013). In other words, while this law is necessary and important its reach is limited due to 
31 
 
the transplanetary reach of cybercrime, which in accordance with Rosenau (2003) and Scholte 
(2005) would require cybercrime to also be addressed at a supranational level. 
Likewise, legislation on cybersecurity since the advent of the Internet in 1991 has been 
sluggish. Three vague federal laws were passed in the decade following the rise of the Internet 
which addressed cybersecurity in some way. First, the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) was passed. The law required health organizations to secure their 
systems both physically and technically to protect Protected Health Information (PHI), which is 
essentially a patient’s information, such as social security numbers and health records (Arrigo 
2019). The 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act similarly requires financial institutions to protect 
customers’ personally identifiable data. These regulations were updated in 2003 to include 
requirements for financial institutions to have comprehensive security plans (Wills 2020). Finally, 
the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) extends the requirements to 
protect and secure data to federal entities (Trautman 2015). 
While these laws required healthcare, financial, and government organizations to secure 
their data, they did not provide guidelines or standards on cybersecurity, only that it be ‘reasonable’ 
(Singh 2016). Alexander (2007) explains “The many acts of legislation that have been formed still 
allow for loopholes and do not properly address the many threats that are occurring or are soon to 
occur” (Alexander 2007). Thus, even though some laws were created around cybersecurity, they 
were not comprehensive enough to truly address the simultaneously growing cybercrime 
challenges. Singer and Friedman (2014) attribute the slow development of cybersecurity policy to 
the fact that those making the policies are often not familiar with computers in general or 
cybersecurity in particular due to either age or lack of technical expertise.  
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The older generation of leaders are not likely to have much familiarity with computers 
because computers are relatively new. The personal computer was invented in 1974, but did not 
become widespread until the 1980s. Even then, machines were limited in their capabilities. Singer 
and Friedman (2014) explain, “[a]s late as 2001, the Director of the FBI did not have a computer 
in his office, while the US Secretary of Defense would have his assistant print out e-mails to him, 
write his response in pen, and then have the assistant type them back in” (Singer and Friedman 
2014). These officials are not alone. In a 2015 interview with NBC correspondent Chuck Todd, 
Senator Lindsey Graham and Senator John McCain advised they have never used email. Chuck 
Todd explained,  
And he wasn't alone. In fact, a bunch of senators looked up from their typewriters to say 
they don't use email either. So our luddite caucus includes Tom Carper from Delaware, 
Orrin Hatch, Pat Roberts, Chuck Schumer said if he started emailing, he'd never stop, and 
Richard Shelby of Alabama. Even Bill Clinton's spokesperson insists the former president 
has only sent two emails in his life. (Meet The Press 2015) 
 
The lack of familiarity with computers and cyberspace even affects the third branch of government, 
as eight out of nine Supreme Court justices confirmed in 2013 they also do not use email. These 
various leaders are in charge of establishing cyber security legislation or, in the case of the 
Supreme Court, determining what is legal in cyberspace, yet they have such limited experience 
with this area (Singer and Friedman 2014).  
While the older generation lacks experience with computers in general, younger 
generations are not necessarily more adept at cybersecurity. A 2017 Pew Research Center survey, 
tested the American public’s knowledge of cybersecurity and found a majority of Internet users 
were unfamiliar with key cybersecurity terms and concepts. In fact, only 20% of individuals 
surveyed were able to answer eight or more of the thirteen questions correctly. Younger and more 
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educated individuals tended to score better, but overall the survey found the American public’s 
level of cybersecurity knowledge is limited (Smith 2017). 
Singer and Friedman (2014) attribute this unfamiliarity with cybersecurity to a lack of 
interest in the technical side of computers and information technology (IT). This lack of interest is 
likely due to the fact that most companies have an IT department or third party IT support. Most 
people’s focus is on their job role and anything technical is relegated to the IT support. If a printer 
breaks, call IT. If an application will not load, call IT. If your computer gets a virus, call IT. Singer 
and Friedman explain, “Anything related to the digital world of zeros and ones was an issue just 
for computer scientists and the IT help desk. Whenever they spoke, most of us would just keep 
quiet, not our heads, and put on what author Mark Bowden calls “the glaze”” (Singer and Friedman 
2014).  
Whether due to lack of experience or lack of interest, society’s lack of familiarity on 
cybersecurity has created a policy vacuum (Moor 1985). This gap is present in both the policy 
realm and academic realm. For the policy realm, Singer and Friedman (2014) explain “the issue is 
perceived as too complex to matter in the end to voters, and as a result, the elected representatives 
who will decide the issues on their behalf. This is one of the reasons that despite all these bills no 
substantive cybersecurity legislation was passed between 2002 and [2014]” (Singer and Friedman 
2014). During this twelve year gap there were numerous high profile data breaches (De Groot 
2019), damaging viruses (SentinelOne 2019), and the initial rise of ransomware (Savage, et al. 
2015). Yet, like the history of automobiles, the government has been slow to react and to fix the 
crisis of authority created by this dark side of globalization. 
With these impediments to effective cybersecurity legislation in mind we can examine the 
third wave of legislation at the federal level. When President Obama took office in 2009, he quickly 
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announced cybersecurity as a top priority.14 However due to other issues taking precedence and 
partisan gridlock in Congress, his administration was unable to help cybersecurity legislation pass 
until the end 2014. At that time, a flurry of four laws were passed addressing various aspects of 
cybersecurity reform: Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Federal Exchange Data Breach 
Notification Act of 2015, National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, and 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) of 2015. Of note, the Cybersecurity Enhancement 
Act of 2014 attempts to enhance cybersecurity through a voluntary public-private partnership 
which provides for “research and development, workforce development and education and public 
awareness and preparedness” (Singh 2016). CISA attempts to further strengthen the public-private 
partnership through voluntary sharing of information, which can help with strengthening defensive 
measures (Tran 2016). 
These measures are certainly a step in the right direction and may have already helped to 
improve businesses’ cybersecurity. Yang, et al. (2020) analyzed the investment in cybersecurity 
of select publicly traded US firms and used a control group of firms from around the world based 
on the location of their headquarters. They found that CISA positively affected investment in 
cybersecurity (Yang, et al. 2020). However, many scholars and technologists find the laws have 
not gone far enough. Importantly, the sharing of information and other measures are strictly 
voluntary (Singh 2016; Tran 2016). Further, Hallenback (2020) argues that legislation does not 
address IT hygiene, which are the fundamentals of security that are often missed (Hallenback 
2020). Finally, Tran (2016) argues the information sharing will do little to prevent cyberattacks as 
it was, in some ways, already in place (Tran 2016).  
 
14 In February 2009, shortly after being inaugurated, President Obama requested a review of cybersecurity. The 
review was completed a few months later and concluded that there were serious deficiencies in the United States’ 
cybersecurity. In May, President Obama gave a speech declaring his administration would make cybersecurity a top 
priority (Bain 2009; Armerding 2017). 
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Overall, the history of cybersecurity legislation at the federal level reflects Moor’s (1985) 
concept of the policy vacuum. The laws have come slowly and are still inadequate to address 
cybersecurity concerns. Walker and Masood (2020) even explore the question if law is an 
appropriate instrument to fight cybercrime? They find that, while law is “an imperfect instrument 
in cyberspace” it is part of “a whole-of-society approach” that is necessary to combat cybercrime 
(Walker and Masood 2020). In other words, federal law is necessary as part of the multi-scalar 
approach described by Scholte (2005). Supranational and subnational (state) level actions are also 
required to fill in the gaps of authority created by this dark side of globalization. 
 
Supranational Level Legislation 
 Legislation at the federal level in the United States has taken some steps on cybersecurity, 
but is unable to address aspects of cybercrime that are transnational. Globalization, through the 
spread of the Internet, has erased national borders by allowing communication on a truly 
transplanetary level (Scholte 2005). This respatialization causes issues for national governments, 
especially in criminal matters that transcend traditional borders. National governments are 
powerless to prosecute criminals residing in other countries without the assistance of that country’s 
government. This gap in authority has to be addressed through multi-scalar governance at the 
supranational level (Scholte 2005). 
The previously mentioned ILOVEYOU virus attack provides a telling example. 2000 
ILOVEYOU malware outbreak, which “infected about 10% of the global internet-connected 
computers, caused the global economy damages of up to $8 billion, with an added $15 billion 
estimated as the cost for removing the malware” (Ogu, et al. 2020). Yet, the legal charges against 
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the two young Filipino programmers responsible for these attacks were dropped because of the 
“the absence of effective trans-national legislation” (Ogu, et al. 2020).  
To prevent this type of issue from reoccurring, Schjolberg (2008) argues for the creation 
of new laws on cybercrime which are clear and as specific as possible. He reviews the history of 
legislation in international law and argues that states cannot rely on interpretations of old laws 
which they try to stretch and bend to include cyber issues. These laws were not written with cyber 
issues in mind, so attempting to utilize them to prosecute criminals will only create further 
confusion. These laws also need to be as similar as possible in each state. Schjolberg explains, 
“Cyberspace has made a new environment for criminal offenses. Through international 
organizations, efforts must be taken to ensure the similarity of provisions in the individual 
countries” (Schjolberg 2008).  
 In 2001 the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime was led by the Council of Europe and the 
United States was welcomed as an observer. In 2006, the United States ratified the convention, 
which focused on establishing uniformed criminal law, similar to the suggestion from Schjolberg 
(2008). This allows for increased ability for member states to cooperate on cybersecurity and 
cybercrime investigations, enhancing policing of cybercrime (Seger 2011; Clough 2014). The 
“harmonization” of cybercrime law also helps to “eliminate or at least reduce the incidence of ‘safe 
havens’” (Clough 2014). These ‘safe havens’ are areas or countries that a cybercrime is not 
criminalized, so there is no ability to prosecute perpetrators (Clough 2014). An example is the 
Philippines at the time of the ILOVEYOU virus attack (Ogu, et al. 2020).  
Additional states can also join the convention and the treaty becomes more effective and 
beneficial with each additional state (Seger 2011). There are now sixty-four countries from all 
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around the world. Further, many states that have not joined have still used the convention as a 
template for their own national cybercrime legislation (Hakmeh and Peters 2020).  
However, there are some critics of the Budapest Convention. Seger (2011) argues that the 
criticism is less the substance of the treaty but the fact that their respective country did not 
participate in the negotiation of the Convention” (Seger 2011). Countries also criticize that the 
treaty was developed by a regional body, the Council of Europe, and not part of a more global 
discussion (Seger 2011; Hakmeh and Peters 2020). Russia in particular is very critical of the 
convention, which they see as a challenge to state sovereignty (Clough 2013; Hakmeh and Peters 
2020). In fact, at the United Nations in December 2019 Russia proposed the establishment of a 
committee to examine the creation of a new treaty on cybercrime to replace the Budapest 
Convention (Hakmeh and Peters 2020).  
 In addition to critics, the Budapest Convention also has some limitations. Importantly, the 
Budapest Convention establishes criminal law on cybercrime, but it does not address 
cybersecurity, which is more focused on “critical information infrastructure and national security” 
making it difficult for states to come to an agreement (Seger 2011). Ogu, et al. (2020) argue that 
the digital divide15 and sovereign political interests are preventing the world from moving towards 
such a legislative framework. In the short term, states with similar attributes, such as falling on the 
same side of the digital divide and from similar regions, can begin to establish supra-state 
legislative frameworks as a first move towards a global consensus (Ogu, et al. 2020). Ilves, et al. 
(2016) similarly find that the cybersecurity uniformity has suffered due to differing opinions on 
cybersecurity amongst the member states of the European Union. For example,  
 
15 Ogu, et al (2020) explains that the term “digital divide” refers to dichotomy the areas of the world that have access 
to advanced digital technologies, such as computers and the Internet, and those areas that do not have these 
technologies. This concept is now being extended to include the “cross-border limitations on data flows by 
dominating countries of the world due to sovereign economic and trade interest […]” (Ogu, et al. 2020).  
38 
 
Some governments, including Germany and the Netherlands, treat cybersecurity as a 
question of homeland security, while others, such as Latvia and Denmark, consider it a 
question of defense. Still other countries, including Finland and Italy, see cybersecurity as 
a matter of commerce and communications. (Ilves, et al. 2016) 
 
In other words, they find that an issue to a European consensus on cybersecurity is member state 
concerns over sovereignty.  
 The United States is party to the only convention on cybercrime at the supranational level. 
This treaty certainly benefits the United States and its ability to prosecute cybercriminals. 
However, the convention could be improved and adopted more widely to reduce ‘safe havens’ 
(Clough 2014). Further, the convention does not address cybersecurity, as that is a more sensitive 
subject that may be better dealt with at the national or subnational levels (Seger 2011). The next 
section reviews how this gap in governance has been addressed at the subnational level.  
 
State Level Legislation 
Cybersecurity legislation at the subnational or state level is as complex as or more than at 
the federal or supranational levels. It would be easy to assume that cybersecurity at the state and 
local level is simpler because these entities are smaller than national governments or supranational 
organizations, but this assumption would be a mistake. State and local governments have a wide 
range of entities that fall within their mandate to secure both physically and in cyberspace. Flynn 
(2016) explains, “State and local governments have the responsibility to protect dams, freeway 
systems, power and water plants, emergency communications, personal identifiable information, 
health care records, educational institutions, and banking systems” (Flynn 2016). These systems 
and entities are difficult to address at the national or supranational level, so it is left to state and 
local governments to help fill in the gaps in governance on cybersecurity. 
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Even with these complexities, states have been capable of enacting legislation more quickly 
than at the federal level. For example, California was ahead of the curve on requiring companies 
to disclose security breaches that affected personal information of Californians. In 2003, which is 
before the large wave of major security breaches starting in 2004, California passed the Notice of 
Security Breach Act to address these concerns and “punish firms for cyber security failures” (Singh 
2016).  
Further, Alexander, et al. (2020) found that cybersecurity legislation at the state level has 
been increasing overtime. They examined cybersecurity legislation over an eight year period from 
2011-2018 and found 454 policies were proposed from all fifty states and Washington D.C 
(Alexander, et al. 2020). Of these 138 policies were enacted, while the remaining policies were 
either still being deliberated on or were not enacted due to failure to pass the legislature or being 
vetoed by the governor. The most active period was 2016-2018 in which some states, such as 
Maryland, proposed as many as 15 bills in one year. However, other states, such as Nebraska and 
North Carolina, had only one bill proposed in the entire 8 year period (Alexander, et al. 2020). 
More recently, states have overall remained relatively active. From 2015-2019 an average of 21 
states a year enacted cybersecurity related legislation while considering over 900 potential 
cybersecurity related bills (NCSL 2020).  
Given the wide range of state and local government’s responsibilities, the bills proposed 
from 2015-2019 covered a variety of cybersecurity related topics. Some legislation focused on 
training and preparedness through “improving government security practices,” “creation of 
commissions, task forces, and studies,” requirements for security audits, and “promoting of 
cybersecurity training and education” (NCSL 2020). Similarly, Alexander, et al. (2020) reviewed 
twenty categories of cybersecurity legislation and found states most often proposed legislation 
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related to “Legal/Insurance,” “Personal Identifiable Information,” and “Education” (Alexander, et 
al. 2020). They found states appear to fill in the gaps left by federal legislation, which focuses 
more on “Defense, Cyber Pre-through-Post Incident, and in Cyber Sharing between organizations” 
(Alexander, et al. 2020). 
Despite the attention many states have devoted to cybersecurity legislation recently, the 
consensus of the literature is that states are underprepared for cybersecurity issues (Norris, et al. 
2015; Spidalieri 2015; Flynn 2016; Robinson and Subramanian 2016; Karakoç 2017; Rosner 
2017). Spidalieri (2015) put it bluntly, “No state is cyber ready” (Spidalieri 2015). State and local 
governments face numerous challenges towards addressing cybersecurity, including “Lack of 
sufficient funding,” “Inadequate availability of cybersecurity professionals,” “Lack of documented 
processes,” “Increasing sophistication of threats,” “Lack of visibility and influence with the 
enterprise” (Robinson and Subramanian 2016). While all these issues present challenges, a 2016 
survey of state officials found that 80% cite a lack of funding as a major barrier to addressing 
cybersecurity. In fact, the survey found that in most cases cybersecurity allocation made up 2% or 
less of a state’s overall IT budget (Robinson and Subramanian 2016). With budgets this low, it 
becomes difficult to obtain, deploy, and maintain appropriate cybersecurity systems, as well as, 
employ adequate cybersecurity professionals (Karakoç 2017). Lack of funding also undermines 
cybersecurity programs, such as training, as these programs are not effective if no one is there to 
enforce them, which takes funding (Norris, et al. 2015). In other words, the lack of funding 
undermines the policies and work that states have done. This lack of serious attention and devotion 
of resources could be attributed in part to Moor’s (1985) policy vacuum, but no matter the reason 




Effectiveness of Cybersecurity Legislation 
 The review of the history of cybercrime and cybersecurity legislation in the United States 
provides the background needed to review the literature on the effectiveness of cybersecurity 
legislation. With the scene set, I first review Moor’s (1985) policy vacuum to explain how this 
knowledge gap has similarly affected academic work on cybersecurity legislation. The next section 
reviews the relevant literature, including the debate between a centralized versus decentralized 
authority, which is one of the major debates in the literature. Then, I review the current methods 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of cybersecurity legislation. Finally, the last section explains 
how this dissertation fits in and adds to this body of knowledge.  
 
Knowledge Gap 
 As previously discussed, Moor (1985) explains that new technology (e.g., computers) 
creates a policy vacuum by raising practical and ethical question about its use that cannot be 
answered until it is clear how it is being used, as the potential applications of a technology are 
often unknown at its inception (Moor 1985). This policy vacuum certainly is clear from the review 
of the history of cybersecurity legislation, but this effect can also be found in academic studies. 
Pylant (2020) explains the literature is still “immature” compared to other fields and much of the 
current knowledge has been collected by journalists reporting mostly on cybersecurity failures 
(Pylant 2020).  
As discussed above, this gap can be caused by lack of experience or lack of interest 
prevalent throughout society. An additional factor, especially for scholarly work, is the lack of 
information on a subject. Initially, knowledge of cybersecurity is limited to those on the ground 
level actually involved in creating and maintaining cyberspace. Like an explorer on some distant 
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frontier, the cybersecurity pioneers are on the front lines making new discoveries, but their focus 
is primarily on their mission, which in this case are the technical aspects of cybersecurity. We can 
see these types of reports coming from cybersecurity companies, such as Symantec,16 who are on 
the frontlines. These reports help to supplement journalist’s stories, but they are still limited in the 
information provided due to their focus. Further, the reports are not typically peer reviewed and 
the data behind the reports is not typically shared because it is proprietary and, in some cases, may 
contain personally identifiable data. Thus, these cybersecurity explorers help to close the 
knowledge gap but are unable to bridge it.  
This lack of information is exacerbated due to incentives for victims to keep cybersecurity 
failures quiet. Both commercial victims and insurance companies have incentives to not report 
cybersecurity attacks, such as ransomware payouts, as they want to avoid scrutiny and protect their 
reputations (Dudley 2019).  These motivations are certainly rational, but without adequate data 
scholars are limited in the approaches, such as quantitative analysis, they can use to study this 
subject, which holds back the field widening the knowledge gap.  
 
Literature Review 
 The knowledge gap, especially due to the lack of available data, has resulted in most of the 
literature being comprised of qualitative analyses. These studies often approach cybersecurity 
legislation with a historical review of legislation in the country, supranational organization, or state 
they were assessing.17 Within this approach, some authors chose to perform a comparative 
 
16 See: Savage, Kevin, et al. “The Evolution of Ransomware.” Symantec, 6 Aug. 2015, pp. 1–56. 
17 See examples of this approach: United States, Congress (2013), Ilves (2016), Kelly (2012), Newmeyer (2012), 
Nwankwo and Ukaoha (2019), Schjolberg (2008), and Sutherland (2017). 
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historical review in which they assessed two or more entities’ cybersecurity legislation.18 This 
approach has an advantage of demonstrating the differences of cybersecurity legislation 
throughout the world and the authors also often analyze the pros and cons of each entity’s 
legislation. For example, Nir Kshetri (2019) analyzes the cybersecurity legislation in Africa.  
 Other scholars have taken more unique approaches to examine cybersecurity legislation. 
Trautman (2015) approaches cybersecurity policy in the United States through the lens of 
epidemiology. In addition to providing a thorough review of US cybersecurity legislation, he 
compares the cybersecurity dilemma to the Ebola crisis. He argues, “Cybersecurity vulnerability 
has the potential to be the "ultimate weapon" used against the United States” (Trautman 2015). 
Conversely, Brito and Watkins (2011) argue against framing the cybersecurity issue in dire terms. 
They caution against over-inflating the issue as it presents dangers akin to the pre-war inflation of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. They believe it could lead to the creation of a “cyber-
industrial complex” similar to the military-industrial complex, which has great sway over policy 
that often benefits security companies. Their main concern is to make sure cybersecurity policy is 
based on facts, not over-inflation or economic self-interest (Brito and Watkins 2011). 
Moore (2010) examines cybersecurity legislation from an economics perspective, which 
focuses more on the cost benefit analysis of actors. Importantly, the costs of failed cybersecurity 
often do not fully fall on the organization that failed. Instead, these costs are spread out amongst 
other actors, but primarily society as a whole. He argues to solve this issue of misaligned 
incentives, legislation, such as ex post liability, should be passed which “allocate responsibilities 
 
18 See examples of this approach: Blomquist (2020) explores legislation across the 50 states in the United States;  
Kshetri (2019) analyzes countries in Africa; Flowers, et al. (2013) focuses on the United States but briefly touches 
on a variety of countries throughout the world; Shackelford and Kastelic (2014) examine the United States and G20 
countries; and Schackelford and Bohm (2016) compares and contrasts United States and Canada. 
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and liabilities so that the parties in a position to fix problems have an incentive to do so” (Moore 
2010). This analysis provides an alternative look at potential cybersecurity legislation.  
Also utilizing an economic perspective, Yang, et al. (2020) focus on the exploring the 
effects of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA) on “firms' attitudinal changes 
toward investing in cybersecurity” (Yang, et al. 2020). They perform a quantitative assessment of 
this recent cybersecurity legislation. They analyzed the investment in cybersecurity of select 
publicly traded US firms and used a control group of firms from around the world based on the 
location of their headquarters. They found that CISA positively affected investment in 
cybersecurity (Yang, et al. 2020). 
 Amongst these various approaches, some of the literature has debated over the centralized 
or decentralized cybersecurity authority. At a national level, Kelly (2012), who believes the 
Department of Homeland Security should have authority, and Newmeyer (2012), who believes 
that a new cabinet position should be established to have authority, agree that authority on 
cybersecurity needs to be centralized. Kelly (2012) explains the decentralized framework, which 
was being proposed by the opposition, relies more on private entities to enhance cybersecurity, 
which is less effective at organizing and leading the country’s cybersecurity. On the other hand, 
Rosner (2017) suggests a bottom up approach could focus on strengthening state and local 
governments so that they can handle cybersecurity issues.  
 Blomquist (2020) examines the pros and cons of centralized and decentralized frameworks 
at the state and local level. Blomquist (2020) finds that centralization allows for consistent 
application of security controls (Center for Digital Government 2018), reduced cost and 
complexity (Check Point 2020), and greater flexibility to expand networks and adopt new 
technologies (Palo Alto Network 2017). One way to accomplish this is through virtualization 
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(Rasmussen 2002), which allows enhanced controls of cybersecurity (Sullivan 2018), reduces the 
number of physical servers increasing efficiency (Rouse 2019), and allows for issues on the 
network to be more easily identified and remediated (Pal 2015). On the other hand, decentralization 
of cybersecurity allows entities to reduce vulnerability from a single point of failure (SPOF) by 
creating redundancy (Rouse 2009), which can prevent an issue from affecting the entire system 
(Blomquist 2020). The decentralization and elimination of SPOF can be achieved by blockchain 
technology, which replicates data creating redundancy (Farmer 2017). Blomquist (2020) argues 
that states and local authority should adopt a hybrid approach, which both incorporates 
virtualization to centralize the security controls and blockchain technology to decentralize the 
points of failure and create redundancy (Blomquist 2020). In fact, many states have begun to 
explore both options in recent years (NCSL 2020).  
 Pylant (2020) takes a more systematic approach to evaluating the centralized versus 
decentralized versus hybrid debate. She uses data from the Nationwide Cybersecurity Review and 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s five key functions, “identify, protect, detect, 
respond, and recover,” to evaluate the effectiveness of each form of governance at the state level 
(Pylant 2020). Through quantitative analysis she finds that states with centralized authority are 
more effective at the five cybersecurity functions, while states with decentralized authority 
performed the worst. The hybrid approach appeared to be close to a centralized approach and she 
suggests it as an alternative to full centralization (Pylant 2020). 
 In addition to Pylant’s (2020) approach, other studies have sought to not only recommend 
potential policy prescriptions, but also evaluate the effectiveness of cybersecurity legislation. One 
of the most used standards is the Cyber Readiness Index (CRI) (Hathaway 2013). The index 
measures countries’ cybersecurity readiness on five criteria: 
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• Articulation and publication of a National Cyber Security Strategy 
• Does the country have an operational Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) or 
Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)? 
• Has the country demonstrated commitment to protect against cyber crime? 
• Does the country have an information sharing mechanism? 
• Is the country investing in cyber security basic and applied research and funding cyber 
security initiatives broadly? (Hathaway 2013) 
 
These criteria were updated in the CRI 2.0 in 2015 to seven detailed categories: “1. National 
strategy; 2. Incident response; 3. E-crime and law enforcement; 4. Information sharing; 5. 
Investment in research and development (R&D); 6. Diplomacy and trade; and 7. Defense and crisis 
response” (Hathaway, et al. 2015). In either case, the criteria helps to identify the areas where a 
country could improve their cybersecurity policy. 
 At least two other studies have utilized the CRI framework developed Hathaway (2013) or 
Hathaway, et al. (2015) to evaluate cybersecurity legislation. Spidalieri (2015) adapted the CRI to 
assess the cybersecurity legislation of California, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, 
Texas, Virginia, and Washington state. Utilizing this framework, she provides a comprehensive 
review of these states’ cybersecurity legislation and finds that Washington and Michigan have 
addressed the most cybersecurity criteria, making them the most cyber ready (Spidalieri 2015). 
Similarly, Rosner (2017) uses an adapted version of the CRI to assess state and local governments 
to see how they should be included in the cybersecurity defense of the country (Rosner 2017). 
 These different versions of the CRI are certainly helpful qualitative tools for the evaluation 
of cybersecurity legislation. However, these tools cannot fully assess the effectiveness of 
cybersecurity legislation against actual cyberattacks without data on attacks. Thus, while the tool 
is certainly useful, the applications found in this review of the literature have been limited to 
qualitative approaches, which cannot statistically assess the effectiveness of the cybersecurity 
legislation. Additionally, while Pylant (2020) utilizes quantitative analysis, she still fails to assess 
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the effectiveness against actual cybersecurity attacks. This lack of testing is almost certainly due 
to the aforementioned difficulty of obtaining data regarding cybersecurity attacks.  
 
Conclusion 
 Based on the studies reviewed there is a major gap in the literature as there are only a few 
quantitative analyses on cybersecurity legislation. Almost all the work on the subject has been 
qualitative, which can suffer from selection bias due to a focus typically on successful attacks. The 
lack of quantitative analysis most likely stems from the lack of data, which, as noted previously, 
is due to the incentive for victims not to report attacks to avoid potential reputation costs (Liska 
2019). Fortunately, this dissertation is able to help fill this gap with a novel dataset that includes 
data on cyberattacks. This data will be used in a quantitative analysis to assess the effectiveness of 
cybersecurity legislation against preventing cyberattacks. Different types of legislation may be 
more or less effective and the analysis in this dissertation helps to discern amongst the many policy 
prescriptions that states have enacted. Further, the use of quantitative analysis helps correct the 
selection bias of qualitative studies by taking into account both the successful, reported attacks and 
the unsuccessful, unreported incidents.  
To study the quantitative analysis of legislation on ransomware attacks, this dissertation 
will focus on state level legislation. The state level is the focus because it is the most appropriate 
level for actually preventing ransomware attacks for two reasons. First, action is needed now and 
the higher up the hierarchy of governance the more difficult it is to move quickly. As noted above, 
there has not been any truly global convention on cybersecurity at the supranational level. The 
most successful has been the Budapest Convention lead by the European Union in 2001, but there 
have been many other regional efforts. Similarly, at the national level the United States has been 
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slow to adopt new policies with decades in between the major legislation. On the other hand, from 
2015-2019 states enacted 233 cybersecurity laws (NCSL 2020). Second, as Scholte (2005) and 
Rosenau (2003) suggest, the governance issues caused by respatialization require a multi-scalar 
approach of governance. In the case of cybersecurity, the focus of governance at the supranational 
and national levels are on broader issues. Supranational legislation is focused on sharing 
information amongst nations and ensuring cybercrimes are criminalized similarly in all countries 
so that perpetrators can be prosecuted if caught. Similarly, at the national level the focus has been 
on criminalization, information sharing between public and private sectors, and data protection 
more broadly. However, the state level can fill in the governance gaps caused by respatialization. 
State governments can enact laws specific to the issues their constituents face, which can help 
combat cybersecurity threats, such as ransomware. 
 The next chapter will explore ransomware in more detail to reveal the strategies used in 
this cybercrime. By understanding ransomware’s strategies, it will become clearer how different 
policies may affect ransomware attacks. Training will be shown to be an effective counterstrategy 





UNDERSTANDING RANSOMWARE AND AN EFFECTIVE COUNTERSTRATEGY 
 
 Cybersecurity legislation is critical to defend against cybercrime in general, but the focus 
of this dissertation is on ransomware.  To determine the best counterstrategy against ransomware, 
we first need to better understand what ransomware is and how it works. This chapter starts by 
defining ransomware. Then the history of ransomware is discussed to give a background for 
understanding the strategies used by cybercriminals in ransomware. These underlying strategies 
of ransomware are then discussed in more detail. The final section builds on these lessons to make 
clear that a combination of training, up to date anti-virus programs, and good cyber hygiene are 
the most effective counterstrategies for preventing ransomware.   
 
Definition of Ransomware 
Ransomware is a type of malicious software or malware which, after infecting a computer, 
tries to extort the victim (Hernandez-Castro, et al. 2020). Some forms of ransomware add files to 
a computer, which could be incriminating. Then the attacker threatens to reveal the illicit materials 
to the authorities unless a ransom is paid (Hernandez-Castro, et al. 2020). However, the focus of 
this dissertation is on ransomware that encrypts a victim’s data and demands a ransom payment 
within a limited time window in exchange for a decryption key. If the victim refuses to pay, they 
risk losing their data forever (Kaspersky 2020). This type of attack was “originally called 
cryptovirus but later also referred to as crypto-ransomware or simply ransomware” (Hernandez-




History of Ransomware 1989-2010 
Surprisingly, the first attempted ransomware attack occurred before the spread of the 
Internet. In 1989, the AIDs Trojan, also known as PC Cyborg Trojan, was spread to victims from 
infected floppy discs (Trautman and Ormerod 2018). The floppy discs were handed out at a World 
Health Organization’s International Aids conference and were thought to contain information 
about the AIDs health crisis (Richardson and North 2017). The scam was enacted by Joseph Popp, 
an evolutionary biologist, who distributed “20,000 copies of [the floppy disc] to researchers in 90 
countries” (Waddell 2016). Once installed on a computer, the malware then laid dormant for 90 
computer reboots and then encrypted file names (Waddell 2016). An error message was then 
displayed disguising the ransom demand as a software renewal which demanded $189 for renewal 
or $378 for lifetime renewal. However, the encryption was rudimentary and only encrypted the 
file names, not the actual files. So many security experts were able to fix the issue without paying 
the ransom. Further, the ransom was rather arduous to pay, as the demand required victims to send 
a cashier’s check or international money order to an address in Panama. In the end, Popp did not 
make much money off the attack and was eventually arrested (Waddell 2016). 
  During the next decade and a half, as the Internet was established, ransomware attacks 
were insignificant (Nadir and Bakhshi 2018).19 However, during this time the theoretical 
underpinnings of cryptoviral ransomware attacks was established. Traditionally, cryptography has 
been seen as a defensive tactic, but Adam Young and Moti Yung (1996) theorized that 
cryptography could be used offensively with malware to infect a computer, encrypt it, and force 
 
19 Nadir and Bakhshi (2018) explain that during this time period ransomware in the form of “fake tools,” such as 
spyware or performance enhancement, were used. These attacks, similar to Popp’s attack, made the victim believe 
they were in need of additional software to prevent or fix problems with the computer, but in actuality there was no 
issue. These attacks generally requested the victim pay between $30 and $90. Once paid, nothing happened as there 
was no issue to begin with (Nadir and Bakhshi 2018).  
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the victim to pay a ransom (Young and Yung 1996). They advised they came up with the idea 
based off Plopp’s failed floppy disc attempt and thinking about the ‘facehugger’ creature from the 
movie Alien. Like the creature, ransomware forms “a forced symbiotic relationship between a 
computer virus and its host where removing the virus is more damaging than leaving it in place 
(Young and Yung 2017). Young and Yung (1996) were able to accomplish creating a “forced 
symbiotic relationship” by making the victim dependent on the attack in order to be able to regain 
access to their encrypted data.20  
The first modern ransomware, which used encryption similar to the theoretical models 
developed by Young and Yung (1996), began to emerge in 2005 (Hampton and Baig 2015). For 
the next six years, ransomware criminals began developing different strains of ransomware to try 
to stay one step ahead of security experts. In 2005 and 2006, some early forms of cryptoviral 
ransomware, such as Trojan.Gpcoder, Trojan.Cryzip, and Trojan.Archiveus, were created and 
were often spread using spam emails (Richardson and North 2017). In 2008, locker ransomware, 
which locked victims out of their computer, began to appear alongside more sophisticated fake 
antivirus programs, which made victims believe they were obtaining a legitimate security software 
(Savage, et al. 2015).  
These early attacks suffered from suboptimal payment methods. The Trojan.Archiveus 
ransomware strain “asked the victim to buy medication over the internet using certain online 
 
20 The dependence is created because of the way the cryptovirus is created. Young and Yung (2017) explain: 
In cryptoviral extortion, the attacker generates a key pair for a public key cryptosystem and places the 
"public encryption key" in the cryptovirus. The corresponding "private decryption key" is kept private. The 
crypto-virus spreads and infects many host systems. It attacks the host system by hybrid encrypting the 
victim's files: encrypting the files with a locally generated random symmetric key and encrypting that key 
with the public key. It zeroizes the symmetric key and plain-text and then puts up a ransom note containing 
the asymmetric ciphertext and a means to contact the attacker. The victim sends the payment and the 
asymmetric ciphertext to the attacker. The attacker receives the payment, decrypts the asymmetric 
ciphertext with his private key, and sends the recovered symmetric key to the victim. The victim deciphers 
his files with the symmetric key. (Young and Yung 2017) 
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pharmacy URLs. The victim then needed to submit the order ID to get the password to decrypt the 
archive files” (Savage, et al. 2015). While the locker ransomware strain, Trojan.Randsom.C, 
locked the victim’s computer and required the victim to call a premium-rate phone number. Other 
forms of payment included premium rate SMS message (Scott-Cowley 2017) and Ukash or a 
Paysafecard, which is a pre-paid voucher (Keizer 2011). While better than Popp’s mail in payment 
method, these early ransomware strains’ payment methods still limited the expected payment per 
attack to a few hundred dollars or less (Keizer 2011; Savage, et al. 2015; Scott-Cowley 2017).  
Further, these early attacks generally contained numerous flaws and poor encryption 
techniques. Hampton and Baig (2015) explain, “Many variants of GPCode contained flaws 
including poorly implemented encryption routines, insecure encryption keys, or poor file deletion 
strategies, which allowed recovery of deleted content […] (Hampton and Baig 2015). Decryption 
keys or passwords were often left in the code of the malware, which could be accessed by a tech 
savvy victim to unlock their system (Nadir and Bakhshi 2018). For example, the Trojan.Cryzip 
ransomware strain copied files into password protected folders and deleted the original files, but 
left the password in the coding, which could be found and used to recover the files without paying 
the ransom (Savage, et al. 2015).  
The limited payment methods and generally deficient encryption kept these early attacks 
from becoming much of a widespread threat. The initial wave in 2005 concentrated in Russia and 
its neighbors (Hughes 2016). Soon after attacks began to spread to Europe and the United States 
(Zetter 2015). Certainly many victims were affected over this time period, but it pales in 
comparison to recent year which have seen hundreds of millions of attacks annually (Clement 
2020).  Further, these more recent attacks have increased from the few hundred dollar ransoms of 
the early attempts, to demanding ransoms in the hundreds of thousands of dollars (Karimi 2019). 
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How did ransomware go from largely amateurish attempts to a global threat costing billions per 
year?  
Hampton and Baig (2015) argue that there are three core technologies which were needed 
to allow ransomware to become a global menace: 
• Requirement for strong, reversible encryption to lock up a user’s files,  
• Dependence on a system for anonymously communicate keys and decryption tools, and  
• Concealment i.e., setup of an untraceable way to pay the ransom (Hampton and Baig 
2015) 
 
In other words, the ransomware developers needed the ability to encrypt at a level consistent with 
the cryptovirus described by Young and Yung (1996). They also needed to have a communication 
system that allowed them to remain anonymous but communicate directly with the victims. 
Finally, they needed a payment method that was not only untraceable but also scalable so that 
larger amounts could be demanded.  
 In addition to Hampton and Baig’s (2015) assessment on necessary technology, there are 
two other shifts which occurred that allowed ransomware attacks to escalate so quickly. First, the 
development of the illicit ransomware as a service (RaaS) economy has allowed high-tech 
ransomware strains to be easily deployed by novice cybercriminals for a small cost. RaaS is a term 
used to describe the illicit economic activity between ransomware creators and purchasers. The 
creators sell their ransomware to buyers for a fee and then often take a portion of the ransoms 
acquired, as well.  Meland, et al. (2020) explain that “RaaS can have different formats, such as 
source code that the buyer compiles himself, pre-compiled binaries or an interface where the buyer 
inputs information about the victims. This collaborative strategy is a way of achieving a faster rate 
of infections with a lower risk of getting caught” (Meland, et al. 2020). This has vastly increased 
the number of attacks as entry barriers to get into ransomware have become so low.  
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Second, the adaptation of ransomware attacks to target specific victims or types of victims, 
such as hospitals, has vastly increased the cost per attack. The criminals are focusing on these types 
of actors because these actors feel increased pressure to pay the ransom as often they need their 
computer systems as a matter of life or death (Spence, et al. 2018). The cost and the likelihood of 
receiving a ransom payment can be higher when victims have a greater immediate need for their 
data.  
 
History of Ransomware 2011-2020 
 The first two steps necessary for this revolution in ransomware began to take shape in 2011 
and 2012. The first major ransomware outbreak occurred in 2011 with about 120,000 new 
ransomware detections in the first three quarters of the year (KnowBe4 2020). KnowBe4, a 
cybersecurity company, attribute this increase in ransomware to the availability of “anonymous 
payment services, which made it much easier for authors to collect money from their victims” 
(KnowBe4 2020). In other words, a new technology had emerged that allowed payments that were 
untraceable, which made ransomware criminals more willing to engage in widespread ransomware 
attacks without fear of being discovered by the authorities. This new technology was 
cryptocurrency, especially Bitcoin which was launched in 2009.  
 With a new method of anonymous payment, ransomware developers then took another step 
towards making ransomware into a global threat. In 2012 an early version of ransomware as a 
service took off with the development of two toolkits that were sold on the black market to allow 
even amateurs to create and distribute ransomware (Richardson and North 2017). For example, 
one kit was Citadel, which allowed purchasers to both “distribute malware and manage infected 
computers (bots)” for a cost of around $3,000.00-$4,000.00 (Segura 2016). The Citadel platform 
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even allowed novice users to perform advanced cybercriminal techniques, such as WebInject,21 
with relative ease (Segura 2016).  
While these two advances helped to increase the overall number of ransomware attacks, 
the scope was still limited as the encryption capabilities were still not available. So, attacks in 2012 
focused on locker ransomware (Savage, et al. 2015; KnowBe4 2020). In particular, a strain of 
ransomware called Reveton became popular. This strain of ransomware infects a computer, locks 
it, and then “[a] bogus message from the FBI pops up on the screen saying the user violated federal 
law. To unlock their computer, the user must pay a fine” (Halpern 2012). These messages typically 
claimed that the victim was in trouble for pirating music or movies, or for downloading illicit 
material such as child pornography. This form of ‘scareware’ was intended to scare the victim into 
paying the ransom (Savage, et al. 2015). The authors of Reveton even had the forethought to have 
the ransom message appear to come from different law enforcement agencies based on the region 
in which the victim was located (Hughes 2016; KnowBe4 2020).22 The message was convincing 
enough that some victims even turned themselves into the police (Fitz-Gerald 2013).23  
In 2013 a ransomware developer finally achieved the level and method of encryption 
described by Young and Yung (1996). The result was the infamous CryptoLocker ransomware, 
which “used military grade encryption of RSA-2048 bits to encrypt files” (Nadir and Bakhshi 
2018). The author of the malware was also the first to store the decryption key on a remote server, 
 
21 The WebInject or man-in-the-middle attack is a method of obtaining identity or financial information (Segura 
2016). It works by creating a popup on a legitimate website that asks for relevant personal information which appear 
to come from the legitimate website. WebInject “is a very powerful technique that can be used to deceive the user, 
as he will believe that the content he is seeing has been received directly through his bank’s website” (Boutin 2014).  
22 Hughes (2016) explains, “The makers of Reveton covered all their bases. It was localized for virtually every 
European country, as well as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.” 
23 In July 2013, a man in Virginia turned himself into the police after his computer was locked by Reveton 
ransomware. He believed the message came from the FBI as it stated he had been caught with child pornography on 
his computer. He did not realize the message was fake and turned himself in to face charges as he did have child 
pornography. He brought his computer in to the local police, who arrested him after finding the pornography on his 
device (Fitz-Gerald 2013).  
56 
 
matching the Young and Yung (1996) theory on how a cryptovirus would function and making it 
close to impossible to reverse the encryption without paying the ransom (Nadir and Bakhshi 2018).  
CryptoLocker was released around September 2013. It primarily spread through phishing 
spam emails containing an attachment that held the malicious programing (Alintanahin 2013). 
Three months later, in December 2013 this ransomware had already infected a reported 250,000 
machines and made an estimated $27 million in Bitcoins (KnowBe4 2020). However, the lifespan 
of the ransomware was short lived. In June 2014 a “coalition of academics, security vendors, and 
law enforcement agencies” took down the botnet servers that distributed CryptoLocker and two 
vendors released a database “which allowed victims [of the ransomware] to decrypt their files free 
(Hughes 2016).  
While CryptoLocker had a quick demise it was a clear proof of concept of Young and 
Yung’s (1996) theory. It made clear that cryptoviral attacks could be highly lucrative, which 
spurred copycats and an explosion of new strains of ransomware to be developed in the following 
years. In fact there have been at least 72 ransomware strains developed since CryptoLocker was 
released. This explosion was aided by the development of true ransomware-as-a-service in 2015, 
where complete novices can go to a “TOR website “for criminals by criminals,” roll your own 
ransomware for free, and the site takes a 20% kickback of every Bitcoin ransom payment” 
(KnowBe4 2020). This service increased the amount of ransomware strains as individuals could 
access the site and modify existing strains to make new virulent forms with essentially zero entry 
cost. While it is not the focus of this project to examine each one individually, it is worth noting 
many of the strains here in Table 3.1 to show the extent of the increase in ransomware post-
CryptoLocker. These various strains are often related, building off one another to help stay one 
step ahead of the security experts.  
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Table 3.1 Ransomware Strains Released by Year 
Year Ransomware Strains 
2014 CryptoDefense, CryptoWall, Koler.a, Cryptoblocker, SynoLocker, 
and TorrentLocker 
2015 TeslaCrypt V2.0, LockerPin, LowLevel04, and CryptoWall V2.0, 
V3.0, and V4.0 
2016 7ev3n, Locky, Petya, Mishca, The Ransomware That Knows Where 
You Live, CrptoHost, CryptXXX, DMA Locker V4.0, BART (duh!), 
Satana, Ranscam, Cry, Mamba, Fantom, CryPy, Ransoc, Karma, 
Osiris, and Goldeneye 
2017 Spora, DynA-Crypt, PetWrap, Samas, WannaCry, NotPetya, Erebus, 
Diablo6, SyncCrypt, Defray, nRansomware, Bad Rabbit, Ordinypt, 
and Scarab 
2018 Kirk, Annabelle, GandCrab, Zenis, SamSam, AVCrypt, Blackheart, 
BitKangoroo, Satan, CommonRansom, Dharma, and Ryuk 
2019 CyptoMix, Anatova, LockerGoga, Matrix V2.0, vxCrypter, 
MegaCortex, eCh0raix, Android/Filecoder.C, GermanWiper, 
Lilocked, Nemty, PureLocker, Maze, Snatch, and REvil 
 Data Source: KnowBe4. “Ransomware.” KnowBe4, 2020, 
www.knowbe4.com/ransomware#ransomwaretimeline.   
 
 
 To understand more about the changes made to ransomware over this time period, it is 
instructive to review a few of the more notorious ransomware strains. In 2014 CTB-Locker or 
Curve- TOR-Bitcoin was released (Salvi and Kerkar 2016). Hampton and Baig (2015) argue that 
CTB-Locker is the first ransomware to successfully combine the previously discussed attributes 
needed to become a successful ransomware strain. They explain that CTB-Locker had “fast secure 
encryption,” anonymous communication through TOR (The Onion Routing protocol), and 
“secure, untraceable” payment through Bitcoin (Hampton and Baig 2015). Many other strains have 
since incorporated these attributes, as well as, developed additional tactics to increase the breadth 
or the depth of their attacks. 
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 While there have been many devastating ransomware strains, 2017 saw two of the worst. 
First the WannaCry ransomware strain struck in May and quickly spread worldwide. India was 
one of the worst affected countries, but the ransomware also affected “FedEx, Nissan, railway 
companies in Germany, Russian Railways, Interior ministry, telecommunication company like 
[MegaFon in Russia and] Telefonica in Spain” (Mohurle and Patil 2017). The attack quickly 
“infected over 300,000 computers in over 150 countries” (KnowBe4 2020). The reason the attack 
was able to spread so quickly was due to an innovation making the ransomware strain behave more 
like a worm24 allowing it to “propagate and attack various target networks in a short space of time 
without any human intervention” (Zimba and Chishimba 2019). The attack is believed to have 
come from North Korea using an exploit stolen from the NSA (Trautman and Ormerod 2018). 
 The second attack struck less than a month later from the NotPetya ransomware strain. This 
attack utilized the same exploit as the WannaCry ransomware (Palmer 2019). It is believed to have 
been developed by Russia to attack Ukraine, but the ransomware quickly spread beyond Ukraine 
around the globe (Trautman and Ormerod 2018; Palmer 2019). One unintended victim was the 
global shipping company Maersk, which had “almost 50,000 infected endpoints and thousands of 
applications and servers across 600 sites in 130 countries” (Palmer 2019). There were two 
innovations that made the NotPetya attack such a devastating and widespread attack. First, this 
ransomware strain had no intentions of returning the victim’s data as the program was designed to 
encrypt the victim’s files and then essentially throw away the key (KnowBe4 2020). This meant 
that even if the ransom was paid, there was no chance at recovering the files, which would need to 
be either recovered from a backup or rebuilt. Second, NotPetya included a secondary mechanism 
 
24 A computer worm is another form of malware, which can modify and delete files, make copies of itself to be 
spread over a network, “steal data, install a backdoor, and allow a hacker to gain control over a computer and its 
systems settings” (NortonLifeLock 2020). In this case, the WannaCry ransomware utilized the techniques worms 
use to copy themselves and spread in order to infect additional computers quickly (Zimba and Chishimba 2019).  
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called Mimikatz, which was able to obtain “a Windows user’s password out of a computer’s RAM” 
Trautman and Ormerod 2018). This allowed the malware to infect vulnerable machines that had 
not been correctly patched to fix the previously mentioned exploit and then using Mimikatz the 
ransomware was able to obtain the administrator credentials to infect the entire network, including 
computers that had been patched (Trautman and Ormerod 2018). This secondary mechanism 
greatly increased the breadth of the attack, allowing the ransomware to spread like wildfire around 
the globe.  
More recent ransomware strains have developed further innovations. MegaCortex was 
developed specifically for targeting corporate networks (KnowBe4 2020. It is designed to 
automatically infect the network and spread throughout, increasing the depth of the attack and 
potentially the likelihood the ransom will be paid (Osborne 2019). Ryuk ransomware developers 
added an innovation to increase the depth of their attacks. “In Q4 Ryuk[, a strain of ransomware,] 
actors began using a “Wake-on-Lan” feature to turn on devices within a compromised network 
that were initially powered off” (Siegel 2020). In other words, once infected with ransomware the 
program forces systems that are off to be powered back on and become infected, increasing the 
depth of the attack. Finally, Maze ransomware has developed into “leakware” which not only 
encrypts the victim’s data but steals it as well (KnowBe4 2020). Marsh (2020) explains “With this 
data in hand, hackers then dictate a specific date to pay by before they publish stolen records on 
the open internet, strong-arming companies to pay the ransom” (Marsh 2020). This innovation 
makes it much more likely a victim will pay the ransom as even if they have a backup that they 
could recover the encrypted data with, the victim likely does not want the data released. Even if 
the ransom is paid, there is some worry that the criminals could potentially still sell the stolen data 
to the highest bidder (KnowBe4 2020). 
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 The development of new technologies, as well as the innovations of ransomware 
developers clearly allowed for an explosion in ransomware strains, attacks, and damages. For 
technology, stronger encryption capabilities allowed ransomware brought Young and Yung’s 
(1996) theory into reality and forced more victims into paying the ransom. The development of 
TOR provided anonymous communication between the attacker and the victim, allowing attackers 
to negotiate leading to ransoms being paid more often (Nadir and Bakhshi 2018).  Finally, the 
creation of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, provided untraceable and scalable payment options, 
which allowed ransomware to attack more broadly and demand more in ransoms with less fear of 
reprisal from law enforcement agencies. 
 In addition to technological advances, the ransomware developers themselves made 
advances which added to the rapid growth of ransomware attacks. Importantly, the creation of 
ransomware as a service has made entry costs for would be criminals essentially zero by providing 
them with the sophisticated ransomware programs for use (Meland, et al. 2020). This service has 
vastly increased the number of criminals using ransomware and the number of attacks. Other 
innovations have increased the both the breadth (Trautman and Ormerod 2018) and the depth 
(Marsh 2020) of ransomware attacks, making them affect more victims and encrypt data in a way 
that prevents recovery, such as deleting backups (Zimba and Chishimba 2019) or stealing the data 
(Marsh 2020). With more victims there is an increased likelihood some will pay and with more 
serious attacks there is an increased likelihood a victim will be forced to pay the ransom.  
 These new technologies and innovations have allowed ransomware to expand and shift the 
focus of their targets. Previously, ransomware targets were mostly indiscriminate consumers using 
Windows operating systems. Now, ransomware can infect Windows, Mac, and mobile devices, 
such as Android (KnowBe4 2020). The focus for many ransomware developers has shifted to 
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businesses and other enterprises, which can be forced to pay higher ransoms per attack (Zimba and 
Chishimba 2019; KnowBe4 2020). Since enterprises can be more lucrative targets, many 
ransomware developers now craft custom ransomware specifically for a single entity or type of 
entity, such as health care facilities (Spence, et al. 2018), to increase the likelihood of a successful 
attack. In other words, these new technologies and innovations have changed ransomware into a 
sophisticated, highly targeted, cyber threat, which costs the global economy billions each year 
(Emsisoft 2020).  
 
Ransomware Strategy 
The history of ransomware clearly shows that the malware has evolved from “hobby 
hackers into a billion-dollar industry” (CR 2017). Early ransomware developers often made 
numerous mistakes, such as including the key in the code of the malware. However, today’s 
developers of ransomware are now often very innovative and talented programmers, who are part 
of sophisticated organized crime syndicates. They have consistently shown they can stay one step 
ahead of cyber security experts by developing new tactics and innovations. Yet, throughout the 30 
years of ransomware history there is one underlying strategy, which can be seen in both the early 
less sophisticated attacks and the newer, highly targeted, and technically proficient attacks.  
The goal of ransomware is for as many victims as possible to pay the ransom (Hernandez-
Castro, et al. 2020). To accomplish this goal, most ransomware25 uses social engineering to both 
trick the victim into downloading the malware and to make victims believe they have no other 
option but to pay the ransom. Social engineering a manipulation technique which plays on human 
 
25 Some ransomware uses other methods, such as “brute force” attacks, to break into a victim’s system. They may 
also have other goals besides collecting a ransom, such as NotPetya which Russia primarily released to cripple 
Ukrainian businesses. However, the overwhelming majority of ransomware does rely on social engineering as its 
primary strategy (KnowBe4 2020).  
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error and emotions to trick victims into providing “private information, access, or valuables” 
(Kaspersky 2020). This strategy has been key throughout the history of ransomware.  
To trick victims into downloading the ransomware, the developers have often relied on 
phishing. The word is a play on fishing because the strategy used in the two acts is the same – bait 
and hook. In phishing, the bait or lure is the text and appearance of the email, which is typically 
modeled after a common company’s legitimate email and is used to trick its victim into getting 
hooked by following a link or attachment that can steal personal information or download malware, 
such as ransomware. Another common part of the lure is to create a sense of urgency by creating 
a false deadline to respond, such as stating the target’s account will be deactivated within 24 hours 
if no action is taken. These emails are usually sent out as part of a spam phishing, or mass 
indiscriminate attack (Kaspersky 2020). Novice attempts at phishing are typically easy to spot, as 
the lure is riddled with typos and grammatical errors. But cyber criminals have begun to excel at 
the art of subterfuge in phishing emails. Emails can be sent which appear in every way to come 
from legitimate organizations, such as banks, except that instead of coming from an @bank.org 
email address they come from @bank.com or other similar ruses.  
Rob Sobers from Varonis, a cybersecurity company, provides a detailed explanation of this 
tactic in his article, “The Anatomy of a Phishing Email” (Sobers 2020). In an example in the article, 
the scammer mimics an email from a major company, such as Apple, creates a sense of urgency, 
and requests the target click a link or download a file, which would of course contain the 
ransomware program.  
The deception used in phishing attacks is currently the easiest method for cyber criminals 
to overcome cyber defenses. In their report, “Verizon’s 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report 
finds cybercriminals are exploiting human nature,” Verizon finds that cyber criminals continue to 
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exploit cyber defenses through weak passwords, known exploits which have not been updated by 
the user, and phishing.   
Considering the cyber criminals use of phishing, the most effective legislation should be 
training on cyber security. Cyber defenses can certainly be bolstered, but in the end without 
effective training cyber criminals will continue to exploit the weak link in the system, which is 
human error. One erroneous click by an undertrained staff member can undo seemingly 
impenetrable cyber defenses. "You might say our findings boil down to one common theme -- the 
human element," said Bryan Sartin, executive director of global security services, Verizon 
Enterprise Solutions. "Despite advances in information security research and cyber detection 
solutions and tools, we continue to see many of the same errors we've known about for more than 
a decade now. How do you reconcile that" (Verizon 2017)?  
More recent ransomware strains, which are more targeted, use an advanced form of this 
technique called spear phishing or even whaling. Spear phishing attacks use personalized 
information to target victims, such as impersonating another employee in the office or another 
person from your contact list. Whaling is a targeted attack which “specifically aim at high-value 
targets like celebrities, upper management, and high government officials” (Kaspersky 2020).  
Through these techniques, ransomware criminals are able to trick unsuspecting victims into 
downloading the ransomware program. At this point, the focus of the attackers is to make the 
victim believe, regardless of the truth, that their only option is to pay the ransom. This task again 
is accomplished through social engineering. Certainly having sophisticated encryption, which 
actually does prevent alternative recovery, can be helpful, but since the goal is to have as many 
victims pay the ransom as possible, the critical problem for ransomware developers to solve is 
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convincing the victims to pay. This problem has been most successfully resolved with social 
engineering.  
Early ransomware attempts relied entirely on social engineering to trick the victim into 
paying the ransom. Kharraz, et al. (2015) found that most of the early ransomware samples they 
reviewed lack the technical complexity to perform successful attacks [… because they] fail to 
seriously take the victim’s resources as hostage” (Kharraz, et al. 2015). Yet, we know from the 
history of ransomware that victims still paid ransoms during this period, which means that they 
must have paid due to the social engineering manipulation that convinced them paying was the 
best or only option. This social engineering can be seen as far back as Popp’s original ransomware 
note, which tried to make the victim believe that they owed money to renew their subscription to 
use their computer programs (Waddell 2016). Later fake antivirus ransomware often did not even 
encrypt or lock any data, it relied entirely on making the victim believe that they needed to buy 
upgraded antivirus software (Savage, et al. 2015). Later, law enforcement scareware, most 
infamously done by the locker ransomware Reveton, tried to scare the victim into believing they 
had been caught by law enforcement and needed to pay a fine or they would face harsher 
punishment. These tactics were in at least one case too convincing, as the victim turned themselves 
in to the police (Fitz-Gerald 2013). 
The more recent cryptoviral ransomware has become so powerful that the encryption of 
the affected data is irreversible. However, cyber security experts have fought back by increasingly 
trying to back files up. The two sides are locked in an arms race. Ransomware developers have 
been devising ways to either encrypt or delete backup files, while cyber security experts have 
developed new ways to securely back up files. Yet, even in situations when the data truly is 
irreversibly encrypted, the ransomware developers must still convince the victim to pay. This task 
65 
 
is increasingly difficult as the FBI, mayors, and some cyber security experts have begun 
campaigning to pressure victims not to pay ransoms (Nadir and Bakhshi 2018). The ransomware 
criminals are still able to convince victims to pay by using social engineering to tout their notoriety 
and provide customer service in order to make paying a ransom seem normal and acceptable.  
“Ransomware is rare (maybe unique) in being a cybercrime that positively benefits from 
publicity and greater knowledge” (Cartwright, et al. 2019). Ransomware criminals want the 
victims to know of their skills and success. If it becomes common knowledge or belief that a strain 
of ransomware is, in fact, irreversible without paying the ransom, then this increases the likelihood 
that a victim will pay the ransom. Further, these criminals want victims to believe that in the end 
they will return the victim’s data unharmed, because the ransomware attack is business, not 
personal. They want to become known as criminals you can trust (Michael 2016). For example, 
the CryptoWall ransomware strain made a reputation of releasing data promptly upon payment 
(Rashid 2016).  
While ransomware criminals have the goal of being viewed as trustworthy, their industry 
suffers from a free rider problem. All ransomware strains want as many victims to pay the ransom 
as possible. As previously stated, building trust with the victims that their data will be recovered 
upon payment of the ransom is a way to increase the number of ransoms paid. However, there is a 
cost to unencrypt the data, such as sending the encryption key (Cartwright, et al. 2019). This cost 
provides an incentive to free ride on the trust built by other ransomware criminals by not helping 
to unencrypt the victim’s data upon payment. In some cases, the ransomware attacker does not 
actually know how to undo the damage they have caused. This issue is especially prevalent with 
the increase in novice ransomware criminals. These free riders degrade the trust and decrease the 
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overall willingness of victims to pay a ransom, which undermines the non-free riders’ business 
model (Cartwright, et al. 2019).  
To combat the free rider problem, some ransomware criminals try to create a brand through 
their notoriety by providing customer service. Some ransomware strains provide professional user 
interfaces to make payment easy and customer service is available to assist with any questions 
(Michael 2016). In fact, many ransomware strains now have customer support websites 
(Weisbaum 2013) or even customer service departments who can help assist victims in paying the 
ransom (Cartwright, et al. 2019). For example, Rashid (2016) explains that “The CryptoWall gang 
is well known for its excellent customer service, such as giving victims deadline extensions to 
gather the ransom, providing information on how to obtain bitcoins (the preferred method of 
payment), and promptly decrypting the files upon payment” (Rashid 2016). Some ransomware 
customer service rivals that of legitimate businesses with support in multiple languages, a FAQs 
section, customer support forms to ask questions, and customer service agents to provide fast 
answers and assistance. They even may decrypt a file to prove they can reverse the damage and 
build trust with the victim (Savage, et al. 2015; Michael 2016). 
Often through these customer service methods the ransomware criminals will actually 
negotiate the amount of the ransomware payment. “Getting less ransom is better than no ransom 
at all, that is generally the basic psyche behind ransomware attacks” (Nadir and Bakhshi 2018). 
Cyber security company, F-Secure, found that 3 out of 4 ransomware criminals that they contacted 
were willing to negotiate and, on average, granted a 29% discount (Michael 2016).  
Ransomware has and continues to rely heavily on social engineering as a strategy to obtain 
their goal of obtaining as many ransom payments from victims as possible. They use social 
engineering to trick victims into downloading their malicious programming. From there, they 
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focus on pushing their victim into payment by limiting their options with cyber techniques and 
using social engineering to convince the victim to pay the ransom. They even provide customer 
service to make paying the easiest option for the victim.  
 
Counterstrategy 
Now that the history of ransomware and its strategy has been reviewed, we can examine 
the best ways to counter ransomware through legislation at the state level, which as explained in 
the previous chapter is the most appropriate level for preventing ransomware attacks. To combat 
ransomware many previous studies recommend individuals and enterprises employ a multifaceted 
approach which includes steps to prevent, mitigate, and recover from a ransomware attack 
(Savage, et al. 2015; Pope 2016; Salvi and Kerkar 2016; Sittig and Singh 2016; Richardson and 
North 2017; Nadir and Bakhshi 2018; KnowBe4 2020). Preventing an infection altogether can be 
accomplished through up to date antivirus software (Savage, et al. 2015; Pope 2016; Salvi and 
Kerkar 2016; Sittig and Singh 2016; Nadir and Bakhshi 2018; KnowBe4 2020), practicing good 
cyber hygiene by keeping programs patched and up to date (Savage, et al. 2015; Pope 2016; Salvi 
and Kerkar 2016; Sittig and Singh 2016; Richardson and North 2017; Nadir and Bakhshi 2018; 
Hallenback 2020; KnowBe4 2020), implementing best practice procedures (Richardson and North 
2017), and training on recognizing phishing and ransomware threats (Savage, et al. 2015; Pope 
2016; Sittig and Singh 2016; Richardson and North 2017; KnowBe4 2020). To mitigate a 
successful attack shut down and disconnect a compromised system at the first sign of infection 
(Salvi and Kerkar 2016; Sittig and Singh 2016; Richardson and North 2017), backups should be 
kept offline or otherwise unavailable to not be compromised (Pope 2016; Salvi and Kerkar 2016; 
Sittig and Singh 2016; Nadir and Bakhshi 2018; KnowBe4 2020), authorization should be 
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restricted to reduce attacks from spreading (Salvi and Kerkar 2016; Nadir and Bakhshi 2018), and 
have a business continuity plan (Savage, et al. 2015). Finally, to recover from a ransomware attack 
know what resources are available for decryption tools (Savage, et al. 2015; Nadir and Bakhshi 
2018) and data recovery tools (Savage, et al. 2015; Nadir and Bakhshi 2018), have a disaster 
recovery plan in place (Savage, et al. 2015; Sittig and Singh 2016), and, once again, have strong 
backups of data to aid in quick recovery (Savage, et al. 2015; Pope 2016; Salvi and Kerkar 2016; 
Richardson and North 2017; Hernandez-Castro, et al. 2020; KnowBe4 2020).  
The previous literature certainly outlines a comprehensive approach to combat ransomware 
attacks. States could potentially enact laws requiring, providing access, or providing support for 
many of these various cybersecurity suggestions. However, this dissertation is focused on 
preventing ransomware attacks from occurring, because the data on ransomware attacks, which 
will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter, is limited in most cases. Unfortunately, the 
majority of the data only includes enough information to know when and where an attack occurred. 
Mitigation strategies and recovery plans are unlikely to have much effect on the number of attacks. 
Instead, they would by more likely to affect the severity of the attack. Since the data for the most 
part does not have additional details that describe the severity of the attacks, we are unable to truly 
assess the effectiveness of these strategies in this study.  
Due to these data limitations, the focus of this dissertation is on ransomware prevention. 
As discussed above, phishing is the main tactic used by ransomware to bypass cybersecurity 
measures. Therefore, anti-phishing training is an important prevention tactic as humans are 
consistently one of the most vulnerable aspects of cyber security (Wash and Cooper 2018; 
Fernando and Arachchilage 2020). The literature on preventing phishing attacks focuses on two 
aspects: the user and the software (Apandi, et al. 2020).  
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Studies on the user side of phishing prevention often focus on the effectiveness of various 
methods of anti-phishing training. Fernando and Arachchilage (2020) find that traditional anti-
phishing programs are often outdated and unable to assist users to deal with modern phishing 
techniques (Fernando and Arachchilage 2019). Jensen, et al. (2017) similarly find issue with 
traditional rule-based training techniques. They argue in addition to the traditional approach, 
mindfulness techniques should be taught, which they found can increase overall awareness while 
evaluating emails helping to prevent them from falling victim to a phishing attack (Jensen, et al. 
2017). On the other hand, Wash and Cooper (2018) find that the perceived origin of the training 
can have an effect on the success of the anti-phishing training program outcome. Training 
performed by experts was more likely to reduce likelihood of falling for phishing than if the 
information was provided from a peer, while stories given by peers were more effective than stories 
from experts (Wash and Cooper 2018).  
However, Dodge, et al. (2012) finds that anti-phishing training alone is not as effective as 
training received after falling victim to a simulated attack. Similarly, Kumaraguru, et al. (2008) 
found embedded training systems, such as PhishGuru, that provide training if the user falls victim 
to a simulated phishing attack work better than generic training a week after the training 
(Kumaraguru, et al. 2008). Building on this study, Kumaraguru, et al. (2009) confirmed these 
results even after 28 days and also found participants preferred receiving anti-phishing training in 
their regular use of email (Kumaraguru, et al. 2009).  
To be most effective, Jampen, et al. (2020) argue anti-phishing training should be part of a 
layered approach, which includes software, such as machine learning, to automatically filter or 
block phishing attacks (Jampen, et al. 2020). However, Qabajeh, et al. (2018) argues that machine 
learning is critical to dealing with phishing in the future as phishing tactics are evolving faster than 
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they can be implemented into a training program (Qabajeh, et al. 2018). Yet, Jampen, et al. (2020) 
agree machine learning is important, but argue machine learning is not a “silver bullet” as phishers 
can use the technology as well to try to out maneuver the defense (Jampen, et al. 2020). Similarly, 
Althobaiti, et al. (2019) review the literature on different automated techniques and find that anti-
phishing training is still a key component to augment the automated filters (Althobaiti, et al. 2019).  
Altogether, the majority of the literature find that anti-phishing training is part of an 
effective prevention strategy. However, there is a lack of evidence that legislation providing 
training is actually effective. While the above studies focus on specific training programs, no 
previous studies examine if training programs initiated through legislation are effective. Instead, 
works, such as Spidalieri (2015), simply argue that training should be encouraged or utilized as 
part of a state’s comprehensive cybersecurity strategy. Thus, there is a belief that cybersecurity 
legislation that provides training would be beneficial. Certainly, if training leads to the detection 
of a phishing email, it can directly prevent a ransomware attack. Therefore, I argue that legislation 
providing or mandating cyber security training should have the largest negative effect on 
ransomware attacks.  
The review of the literature also found that automated filters can detect and prevent 
phishing attacks before they even reach a user and are therefore an important part of an effective 
anti-phishing strategy. However, the available data limits the study of the effectiveness of this 
tactic, as well as, the ransomware prevention tactics of up to date antivirus software, practicing 
good cyber hygiene, and implementing best practice procedures. While the research reviewed 
points to these three tactics being important as part of a comprehensive ransomware defense 
strategy26, there is no available data on these topics. This lack of data is, in part, due to states, with 
 
26 Hallenback (2020) argues that minimum standards of cyber hygiene should be included in cybersecurity 
legislation as many government agencies continue to neglect this important security tactic (Hallenback 2020). 
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the exception of a bill providing funding for next generation antivirus software in Montana in 
2019, not including these items in legislation during 2015-2019 time period (NCSL 2020). Without 
available data, there is no way to quantitatively evaluate the efficacy of these tactics on the number 
of ransomware attacks. 
With the hypothesis in mind, the next chapter explores the data on legislation in more 
detail. I examine how states have varied in their policy approaches to cybersecurity and present 
descriptive trends in cybersecurity legislation. This chapter explores what types of specific issues 
cybersecurity legislation has addressed and the frequency with which proposed legislation 
becomes law using a database of  cybersecurity legislation at the state level from 2015-2019 from 





STATE CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION TRENDS 
 
 In the last chapter, I examined ransomware, its strategies, and potential counter-strategies 
in detail. In this chapter I explore how states have responded to this rapidly emerging threat through 
legislation. The data on state cybersecurity legislation used in this dissertation come from the 
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) (NCSL 2020). The NCSL provides a database 
of all the cybersecurity related state legislation that was proposed from 2015 through 2019. First, 
I provide a general overview and background of the NCSL and the data. Then I present descriptive 
trends in cybersecurity legislation to explore the frequency types of legislation are proposed versus 
passing. I also provide some examples of these bills. I start with election laws in the second section, 
followed by breach laws, insurance laws, crime laws, and training insurance laws in the following 
sections. Finally, I conclude this chapter in the sixth section.  
 
Background of the NCSL 
 The NCSL was founded in 1975 as a resource to help legislatures in the states, territories, 
and commonwealths of the United States. Their mission is to help these various legislatures 
communicate and share resources to improve all of their effectiveness. The NCSL also represents 
legislatures in disputes over power and authority issues between states and the federal 
government.27 One way they accomplish these goals is to provide resources for legislators and 
 
27 States and the federal government can have disputes over power and authority between these two levels of 
government. These disputes can include “state sovereignty and state flexibility and protection from unfunded federal 
mandates and unwarranted federal preemption” (NCSL 2020). The NCSL assists states in defending state interests 
against the federal government on these and other issues.  
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their staffs to use. An important resource are the databases they collect on the proposed bills on 
various topics, such as cybersecurity, throughout the United States (NCSL 2020).  
 The NCSL’s cybersecurity bill database was initiated in 2015, which is the first year they 
began searching for and compiling proposed bills on the subject. Due to the complex nature of 
cybersecurity issues, they set up a “task force” to further bring legislators together and help educate 
them on cyber issues. While the main cybersecurity database compiles the proposed bills by year, 
they also provide additional resources on sub-topics (e.g., phishing statutes) to allow legislators 
the ability to easily get information on previously passed bills on these more specific topics.  
The database on cybersecurity bills provides the bill number and a brief synopsis of all 
cybersecurity related bills proposed at the state, territory, and commonwealth level from 2015 
continuing into 2020. They report whether a given bill was enacted or whether it failed due to 
various reasons, such as being vetoed by the governor. While they do not provide a detailed 
explanation of the process they use to obtain the information in the database, they advise checking 
the relevant legislature’s website for the most current bill status or bill details. Thus, it appears the 
NCSL obtains most of its information directly from state, territory, and commonwealth websites 
that include the full bill’s language.  
From 2015-2019 there were 947 proposed bills on cybersecurity throughout all 50 states.28 
Of the proposed bills, 233 were enacted into law, about 24 percent. The remaining 714 bills either 
failed to pass through the state legislature, were paused indefinitely, or were vetoed. States 
proposed an average of almost nineteen laws and enacted an average of four and half laws. As 
seen in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, New York proposed the most laws, almost double any other 
state at 107, but only enacted four, or about 4%, of these laws. They were followed by New Jersey  
 
28 The database also includes bills from the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, but the thirteen laws proposed by 





Figure 4.1:  Total Proposed Legislation by State 2015-2019 
 
 





































































































































































































































































Figure 4.2:  Total Enacted Legislation by State 2015-2019 
 
 


































































































































































































































































with 65 bills, Virginia with 60 bills Minnesota with 56 bills, and Washington with 54 bills 
proposed. Alaska, South Dakota, and Wisconsin did not propose any legislation. Virginia was the 
largest producer of new laws, passing 25 proposed bills into law. They were followed by California 
with 18, Maryland with 16, Texas with 15, and Florida with 13 bills passed into law. Interestingly, 
Virginia was able to accomplish both a high amount of proposed legislation and the most number 
of passed legislation while they had a legislature that was an average of 60% Republican and a 
Democrat governor. Thus, at least in the case of Virginia, it appears that cybersecurity had a high 
degree of bipartisan consensus. 
North Dakota, Indiana, and Delaware were the most successful at passing proposed laws 
with an 82%, 80%, and 80% pass rate respectively. However, when compared with other states, 
these states passed relatively fewer laws at nine, 8, and 4 laws passed respectively. Interestingly, 
these three states had either Republican or Democrats in control of both the legislature and 
governor. The government in North Dakota and Indiana remained in Republican control, while 
Delaware remained in Democrat control. Four states, Hawaii, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and 
Maine, were the least successful states who had none of the proposed laws pass. Of note, Rhode 
Island proposed thirteen laws and Hawaii proposed twenty-three laws without successfully 
enacting them. It is not clear from the data why Rhode Island and Hawaii were so unsuccessful 
when Rhode Island had a legislature that was an average of 86% Democrat and Hawaii’s was an 
average of 90% Democrat and both states had a governor who was Democrat for the whole time 
period. So the failure to enact cybersecurity legislation was not a result of partisan gridlock in these 
two states.  
As seen in Figure 4.3, both the number of proposed and enacted cybersecurity legislation 

















The previous chapters helps explain why the number of cybersecurity laws being proposed 
and enacted rapidly increased after 2015. Cybercrime, especially security breaches, expanded 
rapidly starting in 2005 (De Groot 2019). At the same time due to the policy vacuum (Moor 1985) 
there were few laws even at the federal level regarding cybersecurity. Then when President Obama 
came into office in 2008, he worked to update federal cybersecurity legislation and was finally 
successful in 2014 and 2015. Yet, these bills were still insufficient to address these growing cyber 
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cryptoviral ransomware, which caused damage worldwide in only a few months (Nadir and 
Bakhshi 2018). Thus, due to the increase in cybercrime threats, such as ransomware and security 
breaches, and due to the passing of insufficient cybersecurity bills at the federal level, states likely 
realized the need to address these growing challenges themselves through legislation.  
What is clear from the database is that states have worked on similar bills at similar times. 
The bills cover a multitude of topics, but there are a few trends in the bills, including bills on: 
elections, breaches, insurance, crimes, and training. The five trends were found by searching for 
keywords within the description of the enacted laws. If a keyword was found within the text, then 
the variable was coded as 1 for that category, otherwise it would be a 0. The data was then 
combined per category by state and year, meaning a single year could have multiple laws for one 
category. If a law covered multiple topics, a single enacted law could potentially be coded as a 1 
for each category. For the election legislation the keywords used were “election”, “vote”, and 
“voti” to cover any permeations of the word vote. The breach and insurance legislation variables 
were straightforward searches for the words, “breach” and “insurance”, themselves. While, the 
crime legislation variable was compiled by searching for “crim”, “offense”, and “penalt” and the 
training legislation variable was created with the keywords “training”, “educ”, and “aware”. I 
checked for quality control by sorting by year and then alphabetically by state. Then I examined 
the first and last 10 cases in the data set to confirm they were accurately coded.   As Figure 4.4 
shows, most of these similar bills passed in clusters in 2017, 2018, and 2019. For example, Figure 
4.4 shows that as the 2020 election year drew closer more states passed laws concerning 
cybersecurity and elections. These trends show that the legislators within states clearly 
communicate and reach out for ideas from other states, likely with the NCSL’s assistance. The 




Figure 4.4:  State Cybersecurity Legislation Trends 2015-2019 
 






 The first trend observed in the cybersecurity legislation enacted during the study period are 
laws concerning cybersecurity for elections. As seen in Figure 4.5, there were a total of 24 laws 
passed in this category. No election laws were passed from 2015-2017, then as the 2020 election 
drew closer nine laws were passed in 2018 and fifteen laws were passed in 2019. California passed 
four election cybersecurity laws, while Indiana and Maryland passed three each. Iowa and Nevada 
both passed two laws. The remaining ten were passed by Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, and Washington with one law each. These laws 
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election security processes, require information on election equipment used in each jurisdiction, 
and requires reporting of any security violations to appropriate body (NCSL 2020). 
 This trend of laws is almost certainly in response to the widespread cyberattacks which 
occurred in the last presidential election in 2016. At that time, there were attacks on voting systems 
in 39 states. In Illinois the hackers attempted to change voter data and while they were discovered 
they were able to steal personal information for around 90,000 people. Other states known to be 
affected were California and Florida (Riley and Robertson 2017).  Interestingly, Florida in addition 
to being compromised in the Russian hack, they also had a ransomware attack on an election site 
only weeks before the 2016 election (Flores 2016). Yet, Florida only passed one legislation on 
cybersecurity for elections in 2019 which appropriated funds to “country supervisors of elections 
for cybersecurity initiatives” (NCSL 2020).   
 
 
Figure 4.5:  Election Legislation Enacted 2015-2019 by State 
 
 




































































Breaches Legislation  
 A second trend observed in the cybersecurity legislation from 2015-2019 are laws related 
to security breaches. There were a total of thirteen of these laws enacted in the study period. As 
seen in Figure 4.6, one law was passed in 2015 and 2016, then four were passed in 2017 and 2018, 
and finally three more were passed in 2019. California and Florida passed the most breach related 
laws with two each. The remaining laws were spread out amongst Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, 
Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Virginia each passing one law. 
These laws address concerns over the storage of voter or consumer credit information, disclosing 
breaches of voter or consumer credit information, and yearly reviews of breaches to address any 
weakness in cybersecurity measures to prevent future breaches (NCSL 2020). 
 
 
Figure 4.6:  Breaches Legislation Enacted 2015-2019 
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As discussed previously as part of the history on cybercrime, some cybercriminals attempt 
to breach government and businesses’ networks to steal data containing personal information, such 
as social security and credit card numbers, and proprietary information, such as research and 
technology, to use or sell on the black market. Breaches can occur through hacking, phishing, theft, 
inside jobs, or negligence. This type of cybercrime has always been present but became more 
significant starting in 2005. Criminals have successfully stolen millions of records of personal and 
proprietary data since that time (De Groot 2019). Thus, the laws passed in this category are to 
address this serious issue by requiring companies to provide reasonable protection of personal data 
and requiring companies to disclose breaches to the affected parties.  
As previously mentioned in the history on cybersecurity legislation, California was ahead 
of the curve on requiring companies to disclose security breaches that affected personal 
information of Californians. In 2003, which is before the large wave of major security breaches 
starting in 2004, California passed the Notice of Security Breach Act to address these concerns 
and “punish firms for cyber security failures” (Singh 2016). As seen in the data, California appears 
to be continuing to lead the pack on this issue. The two newest laws, Assembly Bill No. 1678, 
Chapter 96 and Assembly Bill No. 1859, Chapter 532, add to the code on security breaches by 
explicitly stating that entities holding voter registrations information and consumer credit report 
information must maintain adequate security and disclose any breaches (NCSL 2020). 
Importantly, ransomware can be classified as a breach under HIPPA if personal health 
information was compromised (McGee 2016). All of the states, except for Delaware, which passed 
breach laws had a ransomware attack occur either the year of or the year before the law was passed 





Insurance Legislation  
 The third trend observed in NCSL data is legislation concerning insurance. There were a 
total of fourteen laws passed regarding insurance. As seen in Figure 4.7, the number of these laws 
passed each year increased over time. One was passed in 2016, two in 2017, five in 2018, and six 
in 2019. Indiana passed two laws, while the remaining laws were passed amongst twelve states, 
Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, Ohio, South Carolina, and West Virginia. Within this trend there are two sub-trends. 
First, some laws focus on appropriating funds or investigating risks in order to obtain cyber 
insurance state government. The second set of laws focus on requiring standards based on the 
licensee’s risk for data security, after cyber incident investigation, and notification to the director 
(NCSL 2020).  
The first sub-trend focuses on appropriating funds for cyber insurance for state government 
agencies. Insurance can potentially help boost cybersecurity because insurance companies may 
require a level of cybersecurity in order to write the policy or encourage better cybersecurity 
measures through premium reduction based on the insured’s cybersecurity level (CISA 2020). The 
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (2020) explains cyber insurance could help 
promote cybersecurity “by: (1) promoting the adoption of preventative measures in return for more 
coverage; and (2) encouraging the implementation of best practices by basing premiums on an 
insured’s level of self-protection” (CISA 2020). The insurance company wants to limit its risk and 
may refuse to write policies or charge higher premiums for businesses that do not meet the standard 
level of cybersecurity since they would be considered too risky. In fact, just the steps to apply for 
cyber insurance could benefit organizations’ cybersecurity. “[Insurers] help businesses identify 




cybersecurity is in a company’s risk management strategy and determine how vulnerable a firm is 
to compromise” (Nakashima 2015).  Therefore, laws that provide funds for state governments to 
obtain cyber insurance could potentially increase a state’s cybersecurity because the government 
agencies will need to meet the insurance company’s cybersecurity standards. 
 
 
Figure 4.7:  Insurance Legislation Enacted 2015-2019 
 
 
Data Source: NCSL, “Cybersecurity Legislation 2019,” NCSL  [data file], 2020, accessed August 15, 2020, 
retrieved from https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/cybersecurity-legislation-2019.aspx 
   
 
 Two states passed these types of laws. Georgia passed House Bill 44, Act 37, which 
appropriated funds to the state government for, among other items, cyber insurance. On the other 
hand, Indiana appropriated funds for a study on the possibility of adding cybersecurity as a 
component of the commercial code for liability insurance. These laws could potentially help to 
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 As explained above, cybersecurity insurance should help promote better cybersecurity. 
However, there is a possibility that cybersecurity insurance could cause the opposite effect through 
the creation of a moral hazard, or an incentive to take on higher risk than an entity would otherwise 
take on due to the entity’s expectation to be indemnified through insurance (Bailey 2014). Porup 
(2018) explains, “Why bother doing the right thing if insurance is going to pay you to do the wrong 
thing?” Moral hazards affect all types of insurance, including cybersecurity insurance. For 
cybersecurity insurance the fact of having insurance could cause an organization to invest less in 
cybersecurity, essentially opening itself up to more risk of suffering a cyberattack (Bailey 2014; 
Porup 2018). Baily (2014) explains that this can cause insurers to increase premiums to all 
insureds, which also may increase risk as now organizations must pay higher premiums using 
funds which could potentially have been spent to increase cybersecurity.  
 While moral hazards certainly can create an incentive for organizations to decrease 
cybersecurity, the insurance companies have means to counteract this effect. Borup (2018) 
explains, “The time-tested strategy by insurance carriers to limit moral hazard is to use insurance 
deductibles and co-pays, and to cap maximum payouts. That way the insured shares in the financial 
risk and is motivated to […] deploy strong cybersecurity controls in their enterprise.” Further, the 
reputational costs of suffering a cyberattack present a risk that cannot always be fully repaired 
through insurance indemnification. The loss of customers and future business due to the reputation 
damage from a cyberattack should also dissuade most organizations from falling into a moral 
hazard on cybersecurity.  
 The second sub-trend focuses on requiring standards based on the licensee’s risk for data 
security, after cyber incident investigation, and notification to the director, which are all aspects 




NAIC is an association of the insurance commissioners from all fifty states, because in the United 
States insurance is regulated at the state level. The Data Security Model Law was created as a 
guide for states to use for legislation to “establish standards for data security and for the 
investigation of and notification to the Commissioner of a cybersecurity event” (Kanwisher and 
Mobley 2018). In some ways, this is similar to the breach laws, because it requires the insurance 
companies to comply with minimum standards for protecting personal data and failures to 
insurance Commissioner.  
 Within the study period Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Mississippi, New Hampshire, 
South Carolina, and Michigan, adopted versions of the Data Security Model Law. However, at the 
time of this writing, this has expanded to three additional states, including Indiana, Louisiana, and 
Ohio. A further six states, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, 
are currently considering adopting the law (Weatherford 2020).  
 
Crime Legislation  
 The fourth trend observed in the cybersecurity legislation from this time period are bills 
pertaining to crime or criminalization. There were fifteen laws passed concerning crime in the 
study period. Figure 4.8 shows that three laws were enacted in 2016, seven in 2017, three in 2018, 
and two in 2019. Utah passed the most crime laws of any state with a total of three laws. Colorado 
and Virginia passed two, while California, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Texas, 
Washington, and Wyoming passed one law each. These laws concerned the criminalization of 
interruption or interference with critical infrastructure, electronic communication harassment, 
utilizing a computer to engage in prostitution of a minor, skimming payment cards, and 




Figure 4.8:  Crime Legislation Enacted 2015-2019 
 
 





As discussed in the history on cybersecurity legislation, it is critical that cybercrimes be 
criminalized through laws specifically outlawing the particular behavior, as opposed to relying on 
interpretations of previous non-cyber laws (Schjolberg 2008). Failure to properly codify and 
criminalize cybercrimes can result in the perpetrator walking free, such as those responsible for 
the ILOVEYOU virus (Ogu, et al. 2020). Thus, this grouping of legislation is attempting to ensure 
that the cybercrimes being committed are in fact illegal in their state so that, if found, they can 
hold the perpetrator responsible. The threat of punishment could deter potential cybercriminals 
(Alexander 2007).  
  In fact, it appears Connecticut was following this logic with bill H.B. 7304 passed in 2017 
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ransomware as a class E felony. A person is guilty of this crime if they introduce ransomware onto 
a computer and make a demand of payment to remove it in exchange for restoration of access. 
Importantly, they define ransomware clearly in the law, as Schjolberg (2008) advised should be 
done.  
“[R]ansomware” means any computer contaminant or lock placed or introduced without 
authorization into a computer, computer system or computer network that restricts access 
by an authorized person to the computer, computer system, computer network, or any data 
held by the computer, computer system or computer network. (Public Act No. 17-223 
2017) 
 
The timeframe of this bill shows that the Connecticut legislature was concerned about the rise of 
ransomware and wanted to ensure that criminals could be held accountable for these acts.  
Similar laws specifically criminalizing computer extortion were passed by Texas and 
Wyoming in 2017 and Michigan in 2018 (NCSL 2020). Interestingly based on the ransomware 
data from StateScoop, Michigan, Wyoming and Texas were struck by ransomware attacks in 2016. 
Michigan had one reported attack in 2016 and then another in 2018. Wyoming’s only reported 
attack occurred that year, while Texas had six in 2016 and four in 2017 (Freed 2019). It could be 
that these laws were in response to the attacks they suffered. In fact, Johnston (2018) attributes 
Michigan’s 2018 laws to ransomware attacks, which were not reported in the data, totaling $2.6 
million in damages in 2017 (Johnston 2018). On the other hand, Connecticut had no reported 
attacks before passing the above mentioned law. Their inspiration for passing the law may have 
come from attacks on one of their New England neighbors, such as Massachusetts who suffered 
four attacks in 2016.  
These laws may have been in reaction to the emerging threat of ransomware, but the 
criminalization of computer extortion does not seem to have deterred would be ransomware 




and Connecticut had seven reported attacks in 2018 and eight in 2019. However, the worst was 
Texas who had 17 reported attacks in 2019 (Freed 2019). Potential ransomware criminals were 
likely not deterred by criminalization because of the low technical cost of entry, the anonymity of 
the attack, and globalized nature of the crime. As discussed before, ransomware requires very low 
technical abilities due to the availability of ransomware as a service, which essentially provides 
‘do it yourself’ kits for purchase. Further, the attacks are almost entirely untraceable since the 
advent of cryptocurrency as a payment method. Finally, respatialization means the attacker could, 
and likely is, on the other side of the world and thus difficult, if not impossible, to hold accountable 
unless the crime was egregious enough to be addressed at the international level. Yet, even though 
the criminalization of computer extortion does not appear to deter attacks, it was still important for 
these states to pass these laws to discourage their own residents from engaging in this activity and 
so that if caught the perpetrators can be prosecuted.  
  
Training Legislation  
 The fifth and final trend observed in the cybersecurity legislation data set are bills 
pertaining to training. There were forty-five training related bills passed. As seen in Figure 4.9, 
two were passed in 2016, fifteen in 2017, ten in 2018, and eighteen in 2019. Maryland had the 
most laws relating to training, passing six. California and Texas passed four laws each, while 
Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, and Virginia each passed three laws. Delaware, Florida, and Nevada 
each passed two laws. The remaining thirteen were passed by Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
and Vermont. These laws focus on establishing requirement for training on cybersecurity for 




workforce education and training, establishes scholarship programs for cybersecurity studies, and 
forming committees to investigate cybersecurity preparedness (NCSL 2020).  
 
 
Figure 4.9:  Training Legislation Enacted 2015-2019 
 
 





 Training is a key component in combating cybercriminals, especially against phishing 
(Althobaiti, et al. 2019). Phishing targets the weakest link, human error, to bypass cybersecurity 
defenses and infiltrate the network (Verizon 2017). Phishing is used in many different cybercrimes, 
including security breaches and ransomware. This trend of laws help to better prepare states and 
potentially businesses or the public to be more aware of cybercrime strategies, such as phishing. 





















2015 2016 2017 2018 2019




 Illinois enacted a law specifically with these goals in mind. House Bill 2371, passed in 
2017 as Public Act No. 100-0040, requires state employees to undergo cybersecurity training. “The 
training shall include, but need not be limited to, detecting phishing scams, preventing spyware 
infections and identity theft, and preventing and responding to data breaches” (Public Act No. 100-
0040). The law requires every employee, but the definition of employee “does not include an 
employee of the legislative branch, the judicial branch, a public university of the State, or a 
constitutional officer other than the Governor” (Public Act No. 100-0040). If implemented well, 
this additional training should help to reduce the future number of cyberattacks, including 
ransomware.  
 In addition to this short term training, these bills also focus on developing the future 
cybersecurity workforce through education and scholarships. A 2016 survey found that state 
officials cite a lack of available cybersecurity talent as a major issue for creating an effective 
cybersecurity strategy (Robinson and Subramanian 2016). This lack of talent is due largely to 
small cybersecurity budgets, which mean small cybersecurity salaries. States simply cannot 
compete for talent with private sector, where “salaries for information security professionals have 
risen dramatically in recent years” (Robinson and Subramanian 2016). Thus, laws that create 
programs to educate and develop future cybersecurity professionals are needed to help states have 
the resources for effective cybersecurity programs.  
 To address this issue, Maryland passed Senate Bill 204 in 2018 as Chapter 415. The bill 
establishes the Cybersecurity Public Service Scholarship Program, which provides funds for 
cybersecurity degrees in return for working for the state government for a certain number of years. 




strengthen Maryland’s cybersecurity workforce. However, many bachelor’s degrees take four 
years to complete. Thus, it will take some time before Maryland would notice any change.  
 
Conclusion 
 The NCSL database of cybersecurity legislation provides important information to help 
state legislators combat the now pervasive threat of cybercrime. Examining the database for the 
time period of 2015-2019 there are five trends in the bills, including bills on: elections, breaches, 
insurance, crimes, and training. The laws on elections are likely in response to the cyberattacks 
committed by Russia and others during the 2016 presidential election. These laws will hopefully 
better prepare states for the 2020 presidential election.  Similarly, the breach laws are likely a 
response to the now ever present threat of hackers stealing personal information. These laws should 
encourage entities to strengthen their cybersecurity to avoid any penalties due to breaches. 
Insurance legislation can strengthen the insured’s cybersecurity levels through the underwriting 
process (Nakashima 2015). These laws can also help to strengthen insurance companies 
cybersecurity through laws based off the NAIC’s Data Security Model Law. On the other hand, 
criminal laws seek to make sure these cybercrimes are illegal in their states so the perpetrator can 
be prosecuted if caught. Finally, training laws can directly prevent cybercrimes by teaching 
employees how to spot cybercrime threats, such as phishing. Further, these laws focus on 
developing the future workforce through scholarships to help compete with the private sector for 
cybersecurity talent.  
 All of these different legislation trends are expected to have negative relationships with the 
number of ransomware attacks. As the number of laws goes up, the number ransomware attacks 




legislation, which should improve their cybersecurity preventing ransomware attacks. Thus the 
hypotheses, including the main hypothesis described in the previous chapter, are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): State legislation providing or mandating cyber security training is 
negatively associated with the likelihood that the state experiences a ransomware attack.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): State legislation on cybersecurity for elections is negatively associated 
with the likelihood that the state experiences a ransomware attack. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): State legislation related to cybersecurity on insurance is negatively 
associated with the likelihood that the state experiences a ransomware attack. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): State legislation on cybersecurity breaches is negatively associated 
with the likelihood that the state experiences a ransomware attack. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): State legislation on cybercrime is negatively associated with the 
likelihood that the state experiences a ransomware attack. 
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Any enacted state cybersecurity legislation is negatively associated 
with the likelihood that the state experiences a ransomware attack. 
 
 This review of cybersecurity legislation trends sets the foundation for the next chapter. This 
data is combined with the ransomware attack data, as well as some other control variables to assess 
the effectiveness of this legislation on reducing the number of ransomware attacks. The chapter 






DATA, METHODOLOGY, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, I explain the data and methods used to test my main hypothesis that laws 
providing or mandating cybersecurity training have a negative impact on the amount of 
ransomware attacks. The first section focuses on the data used in this study. I describe the 
dependent and independent variables, explain how they were collected, and how they were 
included in my models. In the second section I describe each model used followed by the results 
of these tests. Finally, the fourth section provides an analysis of the results.  
 
Data 
 In this section, I describe the data used, explain how they were collected, and how they 
were used in my models. First, I discuss the dependent variable, number of ransomware attacks. 
Then in the second section I discuss the primary independent variables, which are the trends in 
state cybersecurity legislation. Finally, in the third section I describe the control variables.  
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the number of successful ransomware attacks on state and local 
institutions per year. This data comes from StateScoop.com, whose focus is on “news and events 
impacting technology decisions in state and local government” (Freed 2019). StateScoop maintain 
a database of every known public-sector ransomware attack in the United States since 2013 by 
compiling attacks which have been made public in the news.29 StateScoop has attempted to track 
 
29 Initially on May 13, 2019, StateScoop reported on a dataset of 169 ransomware attacks, which was compiled by 




the target of the attack, strain of ransomware used, ransom amount demanded, and whether the 
victim paid or not. Unfortunately, for reasons, such as the potential reputation costs, victims have 
incentives not to publicly report or to not fully publicly report attacks. Allan Liska explains, 
“Ransomware attacks are not always publicly reported by state and local governments and there is 
no centralized reporting authority, similar to HIPAA requirements, for these agencies” (Liska 
2019). In many cases the attacks were reported but the details on if the ransom was paid or how 
much was paid was not provided by the victim, likely to try to protect themselves from scrutiny 
that could damage their reputation. Further, StateScoop acknowledges that smaller events, which 
likely occur daily throughout the country, go unreported (Freed 2019). This underreporting means 
the data only reflects a subset of attacks. In this case, it reflects attacks on the public sector which 
were large enough to be reported by the news. Despite this limitation, this is one of the most 


















papers and local television news reports, as “most of these incidents are not “big enough” to be considered national 
news […] (Liska 2019). StateScoop has taken up the mantel to continue tracking ransomware attacks since Lisa’s 
initial report. I spoke with Colin Wood, the managing editor from StateScoop, on August 19, 2020. He explained 
that their first step was to contact some cybersecurity companies to try to obtain additional information on 
ransomware attacks. Since that time, they have continued to update the dataset based on local news and television 
reports. They use Google alerts, which update them as new stories are posted online. Then they sift through articles 




Figure 5.1: Number of Ransomware Attacks 2015-2019 
 
 
Data Source: Freed, Benjamin. “Ransomware Attacks Map Chronicles a Growing Threat.” StateScoop, 22 Oct. 
2019, statescoop.com/ransomware-attacks-map-state-local-government/.  
 
 
This study focuses on the timeframe of 2015-2019. The total number of recorded attacks 
during this time period is 315. Figure 5.1 shows the number of attacks dramatically increases over 
time. In 2015 there were only five reported attacks, but by 2019 the number had exploded to 148 
attacks. That is over a 2900% increase in just five years. This largely reflects the global growth in 
ransomware attacks which rose from 3.8 million attacks in 2015 to 187.9 million attacks in 2019 
(Clement 2020). This rise also reflects the change in ransomware strategy over this time period 
from indiscriminate attacks focused mainly on individual computer users to targeted attacks on 
businesses and government entities. In 2019 in particular, many attacks focused on state and local 
government entities, which are generally underprepared due to budgetary constraints (Gates 2019).  
 The attacks affected all corners of the United States. Figure 5.2 shows the breakdown of 
total ransomware attacks per state from 2015-2019. The average number total of attacks per state 
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report an attack during the 2015-2019 time period. Texas suffered the most attacks at twenty-
seven. They also were hit by the most attacks in a single year with seventeen in 2019. Texas is 
followed in total attacks by California and Georgia with 16, Connecticut with 15, and New York, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania with 14. Overall, states were either affected by roughly the same number 
of attacks per year or trended upward as time went on.  
 Given the large variation in population size per state, it is useful to also examine the total 
ransomware attacks per capita. Figure 5.3 displays the total ransomware attacks per capita in the 
millions from 2015-2019. Examining the number of attacks this way allows us to control for larger 
states, which are more likely to suffer more attacks simply due to their size. Texas and California, 
which have the two largest populations, appear far better as both had less than one attack per 
million people. Rhode Island had the most attacks per capita, with around 6.6 attacks per million 
people. They were followed by Maine, Montana, and Connecticut, who each had over 4 attacks 






Figure 5.2: Total Ransomware Attacks per State 2015-2019 
 






















































































































































































































































Figure 5.3: Total Ransomware Attacks per Capita (Millions) 2015-2019 
 








































































































Primary Independent Variables 
 The primary independent variables are based on state cybersecurity legislation. As 
discussed previously, these variables were derived from the cybersecurity legislation dataset from 
the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL). The NCSL database catalogs all bills proposed 
on cybersecurity legislation at the state level. The database is descriptive in nature, providing 
information on the details of the bills, their current status, and whether they have been enacted or 
failed due to various reasons, such as being vetoed by the governor. They data they use in most 
cases attributed to state, territory, and commonwealth websites which contain the full bill’s 
language.  
The first primary independent variable is the total cybersecurity legislation enacted during 
the time period, while the five others are based off the cybersecurity legislation trends discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4, election, breaches, insurance, crime, and training laws. I expect that the laws 
will have little effect until at least the following year so I have lagged all six of the primary 
independent variables by one year. The data used in the study includes 659 proposed bills from all 
50 states, although some states did not propose any cybersecurity legislation. Of the proposed bills, 
148 were enacted into law, while 511 bills failed to be enacted into law. The variable enacted is 
coded 1 if the bill was enacted and 0 if the bill failed. The data were then compiled by state and 
year, so in a single year a state could have multiple laws enacted. Each of these variables are 
cumulative to account for the fact that laws on the books should continue to affect ransomware 
attacks even past the first year after enactment.  
There are limitations to coding the data using these keywords. First, some laws which 
should have been included in a category may have been missed if the NCSL’s description did not 




synonym or other wording, but also could be that the NCSL did not use the same terms used in the 
actual law. A second limitation, is that the keywords could potentially include some laws which 
did not actually match the category. However, sorting by year and then alphabetically by state I 
reviewed the first 10 cases that one of the five variables was coded as ‘1’ and the final 10 cases. 
This review constituted about 30% of the data and provided a wide mixture of the five variables 
and variety of states. All 20 cases reviewed were good matches for their respective categories. 
While both of these potential issues were concerns, this is a more methodical approach to coding 
the variables.  
 
Control Variables 
 To account for other possible explanations, I include five control variables in the models. 
The first three variables come from The Council of State Governments’ Book of the States 
database. The Book of the States is a collection of data on all fifty states that has been compiled 
since 1935. The models include two variables on the dominant political party in the state legislature 
and of the state governor. Capturing this political data is important as the literature provides some 
evidence that at the federal level Republicans tend to favor decentralized cybersecurity, while 
Democrats favor centralized cybersecurity (Kelly 2012). Further, Pylant (2020) finds that the 
centralized framework is more successful at the state level. Both legislature, who creates the laws, 
and the governor, who can approve or veto the laws, are important as many proposed laws were 
vetoed. To create the variable on the dominant party of the legislature, the overall percentage of 
Republicans in both the state house and senate was used as this captures the Democrats as well as 
they would be the inverse. Likewise, the governor’s political party variable was coded as 1 for 




lagged by a year as the effects of their decisions would likely not be relevant until the following 
year, but unlike the legislation variables there was data for 2014 which could be included.  
 The third variable, which was also derived from the Book of the States, is the estimated 
cybersecurity expenditure per state. This variable is important as the amount spent on 
cybersecurity should reflect what level of cybersecurity a state has. However, the data on 
cybersecurity expenditures is limited. The Book of the States includes data on total state 
expenditures per year, although 2019 was not included yet and was estimated by applying the 
average increase per state of the previous years to the total in 2018. According to some sources, 
the cybersecurity expenditure is roughly 2% of the IT budget (Robinson and Subramanian 2016), 
which is estimated at 2.5% of a state’s overall budget (News Staff 2018).30 Unfortunately, this 
estimation does not capture the true variations between states’ cybersecurity budgets as some states 
may spend a larger or smaller percentage on cybersecurity. Yet this estimate does give an 
approximation that can help to control for the money spent on cybersecurity by states.  
 The final two control variables are population size and internet usage per household. Both 
variables are important as larger populated states and more technologically diffused states have 
more opportunity for attacks which needs to be controlled for. The population data was taken from 
the US Census website’s “National Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010-2019” 
data set, while the number of households with internet data was obtained from the National Center 
for Education Statistics. The average population per state from 2010-2019 was used, as the most 
important factor was the variation between states. Similarly, the number of households with 
internet access was kept constant, but this was also due to availability of information as the only 
 
30 News Staff (2018) provides estimates for the IT budget for ten states in 2018. I used this information with the 
Book of the States data on total expenditures to determine that the ten states spent on average around 2.5% of their 




year available was for 2016. I took the natural log of these variables to help adjust for the skew 
caused by states with substantially larger population and internet sizes.  
 
Methodology and Results 
 To test my hypotheses I used a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. 
In each of the models, the dependent variable was the number of ransomware attacks per state per 
year. Each model utilized all of the control variables listed above, with only one of the primary 
independent variables on cybersecurity legislation per model. This design allowed me to test each 
cybersecurity legislation hypothesis independently to see how those laws affected the dependent 
variable. Then I include a seventh model which includes all five of the trends at once to control 
for any effect they may have on the other trends. I ran these seven models three separate ways. 
The first set of models was the base model which tested the hypotheses for the full 2015-2019 
period. Table 5.1 shows the results of the first seven models. In the second and third models I 
changed the time period to focus in on the two distinct periods, the initial period from 2015-2018 
and the final period in 2019 when ransomware attacks against state and local entities were in full 
bloom. Table 5.2 presents the results of the second series of models. The third set of models looks 
only to explain the variation in the dependent variable in 2019. This series of models is to account 
for the cumulative effect of similar types of laws as well as help to isolate the number of 
ransomware attacks which grew exponentially over the 2015-2019 time period. The result of the 
third set of models are found in Table 5.3. Finally, I present the results of running the 2019 models 






Table 5.1: OLS Models Regressing Cybersecurity Legislation Output on the Number of 
Ransomware Attacks per State from 2015-2019 
Regression Results 
 Dependent variable: 
 n_ransom_attacks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
n_enacted_laws 0.185***       
 (0.054)       
n_insurance_laws  1.468***     1.334** 
  (0.477)     (0.515) 
n_training_laws   0.649***    0.230 
   (0.211)    (0.295) 
n_election_laws    0.959**   0.724 
    (0.463)   (0.522) 
n_crime_laws     0.467  0.323 
     (0.314)  (0.338) 
n_breach_laws      0.502 0.055 
      (0.432) (0.468) 
population_avg_log 0.809 0.427 0.845 0.508 0.368 0.394 0.621 
 (1.785) (1.789) (1.795) (1.808) (1.815) (1.818) (1.787) 
internet_log -0.354 -0.021 -0.455 -0.013 0.111 0.073 -0.221 
 (1.778) (1.782) (1.790) (1.800) (1.808) (1.811) (1.783) 
estimated_cybersecurity 0.012 0.019** 0.018** 0.015* 0.016* 0.017* 0.016* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Republican_governor 0.014 -0.086 -0.012 -0.046 0.033 -0.026 -0.063 
 (0.272) (0.274) (0.273) (0.276) (0.279) (0.278) (0.275) 
Legislature_Rep -0.076 -0.034 0.161 0.218 -0.030 0.137 -0.062 
 (0.664) (0.666) (0.664) (0.672) (0.683) (0.675) (0.675) 
Constant -6.470* -5.305 -5.750* -6.690** -6.250* -6.166* -5.474* 
 (3.291) (3.320) (3.310) (3.345) (3.354) (3.361) (3.308) 
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
R2 0.204 0.197 0.196 0.180 0.173 0.170 0.221 
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.177 0.177 0.160 0.152 0.149 0.189 
Residual Std. Error 
















(df = 6; 
243) 
9.916*** 
(df = 6; 
243) 
9.901*** 
(df = 6; 
243) 
8.877*** 
(df = 6; 
243) 
8.463*** 
(df = 6; 
243) 
8.292*** 
(df = 6; 
243) 
6.798*** 
(df = 10; 
239) 






Table 5.2: OLS Models Regressing Cybersecurity Legislation Output on the Number of 
Ransomware Attacks per State from 2015-2018  
Regression Results 
 Dependent variable: 
 n_ransom_attacks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
n_enacted_laws 0.006       
 (0.062)       
n_insurance_laws  1.161**     1.254** 
  (0.486)     (0.524) 
n_training_laws   0.154    -0.112 
   (0.225)    (0.285) 
n_election_laws    N/A31    
n_crime_laws     0.068  0.148 
     (0.306)  (0.343) 
n_breach_laws      0.219 0.341 
      (0.412) (0.453) 
population_avg_log -0.877 -0.911 -0.836 -0.884 -0.891 -0.890 -0.972 
 (1.304) (1.284) (1.303) (1.300) (1.303) (1.302) (1.297) 
internet_log 1.172 1.178 1.114 1.179 1.187 1.174 1.236 
 (1.298) (1.278) (1.298) (1.293) (1.297) (1.295) (1.293) 
estimated_cybersecurity 0.010 0.011* 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Republican_governor 0.138 0.123 0.146 0.136 0.141 0.135 0.122 
 (0.200) (0.196) (0.199) (0.198) (0.200) (0.199) (0.198) 
Legislature_Rep 0.109 0.036 0.102 0.117 0.100 0.107 -0.013 
 (0.491) (0.480) (0.486) (0.484) (0.492) (0.486) (0.491) 
Constant -2.595 -2.160 -2.431 -2.596 -2.601 -2.452 -2.031 
 (2.423) (2.395) (2.432) (2.417) (2.423) (2.437) (2.429) 
Observations 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
R2 0.143 0.167 0.145 0.143 0.143 0.144 0.170 
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.141 0.118 0.121 0.116 0.117 0.131 

















(df = 6; 
193) 
6.461*** 
(df = 6; 
193) 
5.445*** 
(df = 6; 
193) 
6.457*** 
(df = 5; 
194) 
5.363*** 
(df = 6; 
193) 
5.408*** 
(df = 6; 
193) 
4.329*** 
(df = 9; 
190) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
31 The election laws variable had no result for this time period because there were no election laws passed 




 The first series of models did not support the hypotheses, but did show a weakness in the 
data. Most independent variables were found to be statistically significant, but their relationship 
with ransomware attacks was positive, which is the opposite direction predicted. Enacted 
legislation, insurance legislation, training legislation, and the variable comprising all five 
cybersecurity legislation trends were found to be statistically significant at the 99% level. Election 
legislation and estimated cybersecurity expenditure were found to be statistically significant in 
some models at the 95% level, although estimated cybersecurity expenditure was found to be 
significant at the 90% level or not significant in some models. The adjusted r-squared value was 
between 0.149 to 0.184 in the various models, meaning the models were able to explain around 
15-19% of the variation in the dependent variable. However, the variables were positively related 
with ransomware attacks, which is the opposite direction predicted.  
There are certainly a variety of possible reasons that the model outcomes were opposite of 
the hypotheses. Certainly one factor is due to the limitations of the data. There were few attacks 
and few laws at the beginning of the short time period, which created a challenge for the legislation 
variables to explain both this early period and the later period which saw a much higher volume 
of attacks and more laws. This change was due to the sudden shift in the targets for ransomware 
attacks by the ransomware criminals from more indiscriminate attacks to more targeted attacks 
against state and local entities.  
 To investigate the relationship of the variables further, the second and third model took a 
more limited approach and only attempted to explain the variation in the number of ransomware 
attacks during two periods: the initial period from 2015-2018 and the final period in 2019. The 
initial period is the time when ransomware attacks were really only beginning to become more 




achieved the level and method of encryption described by Young and Yung (1996) in 2013, only 
two years prior to this period. Thus, organizations were only beginning to realize the threat of 
ransomware and ransomware developers were only beginning to realize that organizations were 
now potentially lucrative targets. Further, during the 2015-2018 period, the shift from 
indiscriminate attacks to targeted attacks, and importantly targeted attacks against state and local 
government institutions, occurred. Thus, this period is one of both growth in ransomware attacks 
and growth in cybersecurity legislation. This legislation is in many ways reactionary during this 
period. It is reactionary to both ransomware and other cybersecurity threats, such as security 
breaches. Complicating modeling attempts, the reactionary nature is not dependent upon 
geography, meaning a state may enact laws based on another state or organization suffering an 
attack.  
 This second set of models can be found above in Table 5.2. Due the limitations described 
above, these estimates from these models are almost entirely not significant. The only primary 
independent variable that is statistically significant is insurance laws at the 95% level. This model 
also finds the estimated cybersecurity expenditure significant at the 90% level. Yet, both of these 
have a positive relationship with the number of ransomware attacks. Based on above analysis, this 
result appears to support the argument that this period was largely reactionary in that ransomware 
attacks increased the likelihood states would pass laws.  
There is evidence that this reactionary, initial period begins to change in 2019 which had a 
much larger amount of attacks on state and local targets as ransomware criminals put them directly 
in their crosshairs. The results, found in Table 5.3, were mixed, but found some evidence that 
cybersecurity legislation may have a negative relationship with the number of ransomware attacks. 




a negative relationship to the number of ransomware attacks as predicted. The models with the 
enacted legislation variable (H6) and breach legislation variable (H4), and the seventh control 
model had adjusted r-squared values of 60.7%, 69.6%, and 67.1% respectively, which means they 
explain around two thirds of the variation in the dependent variable. The F statistic is statistically 
significant in all three models, meaning we can reject the null hypothesis for these models.   
The total amount of enacted laws (H6) was found to be statistically significant at the 95% 
level, while the total amount of breach laws (H4) per state was statistically significant at the 99% 
level. The estimated cybersecurity expenditure was also significant at the 99% level, while the 
Republican governor variable was found to be significant in some models at the 90% level. All of 
these variables had negative relationships with ransomware attacks, which was expected, at least, 
with the legislation variables. However, the main hypothesis (H1) that training legislation would 
have a negative effect on ransomware attacks was inconclusive as there was no statistical 
significance for this variable.  
In Table 5.4 I present the results of the 2019 models using a Poisson regression to verify 
that the choice of regression model does not alter the results. The results support the findings of 
the OLM models for 2019. While the coefficients for the variables are smaller, they remain 
negative and statistically significant for the same variables as in the OLM models for 2019. The 
enacted legislation variable (H6) remains statistically significant at the 95% level, while the total 
amount of breach laws (H4) per state was statistically significant at the 99% level. The estimated 
cybersecurity expenditure was also significant at the 95% and 99% level depending on the model, 
while the Republican governor variable was found to be significant in some models at the 90% 
and 95% level depending on the model. All of these variables had negative relationships with 




Table 5.3: OLS Models Regressing Total Cybersecurity Legislation Output on the Number 
of Ransomware Attacks per State in 2019 
Regression Results 
 Dependent variable: 
 n_ransom_attacks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
n_enacted_laws -0.214**       
 (0.094)       
n_insurance_laws  -0.125     -0.166 
  (0.816)     (0.758) 
n_training_laws   -0.516    0.078 
   (0.362)    (0.431) 
n_election_laws    -0.487   -0.415 
    (0.612)   (0.653) 
n_crime_laws     -0.473  -0.285 
     (0.506)  (0.475) 
n_breach_laws      -2.933*** -2.889*** 
      (0.668) (0.733) 
population_avg 0.00000* 0.00000* 0.00000 0.00000* 0.00000* 0.00000** 0.00000** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
internet -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
estimated_cybersecurity -0.150*** -0.149*** -0.155*** -0.138*** -0.150*** -0.140*** -0.133*** 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.036) (0.041) 
Republican_governor -1.272* -1.230 -1.195 -1.178 -1.415* -1.288** -1.291* 
 (0.700) (0.760) (0.725) (0.742) (0.753) (0.616) (0.679) 
Legislature_Rep -1.369 -1.343 -1.774 -1.574 -1.073 -2.278 -2.149 
 (1.612) (1.720) (1.691) (1.713) (1.720) (1.433) (1.576) 
Constant 3.060*** 2.789** 3.068*** 2.884** 2.845** 3.371*** 3.351*** 
 (1.048) (1.124) (1.093) (1.099) (1.094) (0.927) (0.997) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.655 0.614 0.631 0.619 0.621 0.733 0.738 
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.560 0.580 0.566 0.569 0.696 0.671 

















(df = 6; 
43) 
11.395*** 
(df = 6; 
43) 
12.260*** 
(df = 6; 
43) 
11.658*** 
(df = 6; 
43) 
11.761*** 
(df = 6; 
43) 
19.689*** 
(df = 6; 
43) 
11.009*** 
(df = 10; 
39) 





Table 5.4: Poisson Models Regressing Total Cybersecurity Legislation Output on the 
Number of Ransomware Attacks per State in 2019 
Regression Results 
 Dependent variable: 
 n_ransom_attacks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
n_enacted_laws -0.088**       
 (0.034)       
n_insurance_laws  0.131     0.249 
  (0.229)     (0.235) 
n_training_laws   -0.175    -0.00001 
   (0.112)    (0.139) 
n_election_laws    -0.189   0.064 
    (0.197)   (0.198) 
n_crime_laws     -0.256  -0.187 
     (0.173)  (0.186) 
n_breach_laws      -0.726*** -0.766*** 
      (0.199) (0.223) 
population_avg -0.00000 0.000 -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.000 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
internet 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000* 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
estimated_cybersecurity -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.030*** -0.018** -0.021** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Republican_governor -0.400* -0.485** -0.417** -0.410* -0.528** -0.384* -0.545** 
 (0.209) (0.224) (0.209) (0.212) (0.214) (0.215) (0.238) 
Legislature_Rep -0.484 -0.464 -0.513 -0.475 -0.327 -0.525 -0.552 
 (0.533) (0.553) (0.538) (0.544) (0.544) (0.570) (0.601) 
Constant 1.040*** 1.017*** 1.014*** 0.976*** 1.016*** 0.908*** 1.040*** 
 (0.321) (0.341) (0.327) (0.326) (0.328) (0.342) (0.357) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Log Likelihood -94.367 -98.221 -97.072 -97.883 -97.150 -91.328 -89.958 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 202.734 210.442 208.144 209.765 208.301 196.656 201.915 












 The results of the models are mixed. This section will focus on analyzing and explaining 
these results. First, I briefly address the original models, which attempted to describe the variation 
of the dependent variable during the entire period of 2015-2019 and then in the initial period of 
2015-2018. I address why these models do not support the hypotheses. In part this was due to data 
limitations and the sudden rise in ransomware attacks against state and local institutions. Then I 
move on to the third model explain the results. I address why breach laws are significant, while 
training laws are not supported by the model. I also discuss the other findings.  
 The first two series of models attempted to explain the variation in the dependent variable 
over the 2015-2019 period and the initial period of 2015-2018. In both sets of models the variables 
which were found to be statistically significant were also positively correlated with ransomware 
attacks. The positive relationship was likely a reflection of the short time period with limited 
attacks and legislation at the onset of the study period, but then a drastic increase at the end of the 
period. As described above, the initial period was largely reactionary, as states began to develop 
cybersecurity legislation in response to the rapidly emerging threat from ransomware and other 
cybersecurity threats. Further, it was a period which saw great changes in the tactics and targets 
chosen by ransomware criminals. In 2015 there were only five cybersecurity laws passed 
throughout the fifty states.  To explain ransomware attack variation in the first few years of the 
study period, we would need data on legislation going back further, which was not readily available 
for this study. As time went on, states enacted more laws, but then ransomware attacks rose so 
suddenly and dramatically that the total attacks almost doubled just in 2019. This sudden change 
is due to a shift in targets from more indiscriminate attacks to targeting specific sectors or entities, 




 Another potential reason for the mixed results is the level of implementation or 
enforcement of the legislation. The data from the NCSL on legislation provides the type of 
legislation and the amount of enacted legislation. However, there is no measure of the 
implementation or enforcement of the legislation in the models. A law that has been enacted but 
has not enforcement mechanisms or is simply disregarded would not be expected to have any effect 
on the number of ransomware attacks. There is literature which stresses the importance of 
implementation and enforcement. Sutherland (2017) finds that South Africa has adopted important 
cybersecurity polices, such as a National Cybersecurity Policy Framework, but the legislation is 
“being implemented only slowly, with very limited reporting and Parliamentary oversight” 
(Sutherland 2017). In other words, South Africa has enacted sufficient cybersecurity laws, but is 
still behind in cybersecurity due to poor enforcement. This poor implementation and enforcement 
could also be occurring amongst the 50 states included in this study. Unfortunately, there was no 
readily available measure of enforcement or implementation of the legislation used in this study, 
which potentially affected the results.  
To investigate the relationship between the variables further, I setup a third series of models 
which focused in on 2019, the year with the most attacks. These models also used the cumulative 
total per state for each legislation variable for the 2015-2018 time period, which allowed the 
difference in attacks between states that had enacted cybersecurity legislation and those that had 
not to be seen more clearly. The results are mixed, but the models provide some evidence in 
support of two of the hypotheses. One of the models supports the hypothesis that total enacted 
cybersecurity legislation per state reduces the number of ransomware attacks per state. Based on 
the results, for every five pieces of enacted legislation a state can expect to reduce the number of 




cybersecurity laws and ransomware is not clear from the model. It is possible that states that pass 
more cybersecurity laws are more focused on cybersecurity and therefore have increased 
cybersecurity measures in place. More research is needed to determine how cybersecurity 
legislation may effect a state’s cybersecurity.  
One potential avenue for further investigation are breach laws, which also had a statistically 
significant, negative relationship with the number of ransomware attacks in 2019. For every 
additional breach law, a state had almost three less ransomware attacks. Yet, training laws, which 
the literature suggested would be most effective in preventing ransomware attacks, was not found 
to be statistically significant. Why were breach laws significant, but not training laws? 
Interestingly, the two variables actually had a fair amount of overlap in legislation. Of the ten 
breach laws, three of them were also included in the training variable: Illinois H.B. 2371 in 2017, 
Michigan H.B. 4323 in 2017, and Florida H.B. 1033 in 2016. These laws required both training 
and that state entities prevent breaches. The other training legislation is mostly on education and 
workforce development, such as through scholarships. While important, these are long term 
programs whose effects would not likely manifest until at least four years later, which is the typical 
length of a bachelor’s degree.  
On the other hand, the breach laws continue to focus on breach prevention and require 
entities to report or disclose breaches. These types of laws place the ownership into the subject of 
the law’s hands. Moore (2010) argued that one reason cybersecurity is not prioritized is due to 
misaligned incentives. Costs of failed cybersecurity often do not fully fall on the organization that 
failed. Instead, these costs are spread out amongst other actors, but primarily society as a whole 
(Moore 2010). The breach legislation helps to correct this by holding the entity responsible to 




costs back on the organization that failed. The incentive to avoid these costs push these entities to 
employ better cybersecurity measures, which would certainly include training, up to date antivirus 
software, and good cyber hygiene. Thus, by holding organizations responsible these breach laws 
cause them to raise their cybersecurity standards.  
 Interestingly, some of these models found that states with Republican led governors had 
less ransomware attacks. A Republican governor would reduce the number of ransomware attacks 
by just over one. This finding is contrary to the expectation, as at the federal level Republicans 
favored a decentralized framework (Kelly 2012), which Pylant (2020) found to be less effective 
than a centralized framework at the state level. It could be that at the state level Republicans have 
different preferences, but if they do favor a decentralized framework then this finding could 
challenge Pylant (2020). More research on these topics is certainly needed. 
 While the results of the models are mixed, this dissertation is still an important first step in 
pulling together data on cybersecurity legislation and ransomware attacks. The study certainly has 
not resolved the issue of ransomware, but has opened up numerous avenues for potential future 
research. Some of these will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter, but first the next 







CASE STUDY: BREACHES LEGISLATION 
 
 The results in the last chapter found support for the hypothesis (H4) that state legislation 
on cybersecurity breaches is negatively associated with the likelihood that the state experiences a 
ransomware attack. In this chapter I explore state legislation on cybersecurity breaches in more 
detail to further explore this relationship. First I briefly re-summarize the theoretical reasons that 
breaches legislation is negatively associated with the number of ransomware attacks. Second, I 
discuss the California’s cybersecurity breach laws in more detail, as California has long been a 
leader in this area of cybersecurity legislation. Finally, I examine how California’s laws have 
enacted change that further supports the outcome of the model.  
 
Theoretical Underpinnings of Breaches Legislation 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, data breaches are attacks by cybercriminals on government or 
business networks to steal data containing personal information or proprietary information to use 
or sell on the black market. These attacks differ from hacking of an individual user because they 
involve the theft of mass amounts of personal or proprietary data that is being stored by a third 
party, such as a government or business organization. Breaches can occur through hacking, 
phishing, theft, inside jobs, or negligence. While data breaches have occurred for some time, the 
most significant ones began occurring since 2005 as most companies had converted to electronic 
records by that time. For example, Target had 70 million records compromised in 2013, and Yahoo 




 To address this serious cyber issue states have enacted legislation requiring companies to 
provide reasonable protection of personal data and requiring organizations to disclose breaches to 
the parties. There were a total of thirteen of these laws enacted in the study period. As seen in 
Figure 6.1, one law was passed in 2015 and 2016, then four were passed in 2017 and 2018, and 
finally three more were passed in 2019. California and Florida passed the most breach related laws 
with two each. The remaining laws were spread out amongst Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, 
Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Virginia each passing one law. 
These laws address concerns over the storage of voter or consumer credit information, disclosing 
breaches of voter or consumer credit information, and yearly reviews of breaches to address any 
weakness in cybersecurity measures to prevent future breaches (NCSL 2020). 
 
 
Figure 6.1:  Breaches Legislation Enacted 2015-2019 
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 These laws may be effective tools to encourage better cybersecurity and prevent future 
cyberattacks, such as ransomware, because they shift the costs of a cybersecurity failure back onto 
the organization that failed. Moore (2010) argued that one reason cybersecurity is not prioritized 
is due to misaligned incentives. Costs of failed cybersecurity often do not fully fall on the 
organization that failed. Instead, these costs are spread out amongst other actors, but primarily 
society as a whole (Moore 2010). The breach legislation helps to correct this by holding the entity 
accountable to prevent breaches and disclose any breaches. This corrects the misaligned incentives 
by placing the costs, such as monetary through payments for damages caused and reputational 
through the bad publicity resulting from a breach, back on the organization that failed. The 
incentive to avoid these costs push these entities to employ better cybersecurity measures, which 
would certainly include training, up to date antivirus software, and good cyber hygiene. Thus, by 
holding organizations responsible these breach laws can cause them to raise their cybersecurity 
standards.  
 
California’s Breaches Legislation 
California has been a leader in cybersecurity breach legislation and as a leader should be 
examined in more detail to better understand how these laws might improve cybersecurity, 
especially against ransomware. As previously mentioned in the history on cybersecurity 
legislation, California was ahead of the curve on requiring companies to disclose security breaches 
that affected personal information of Californians. In 2003 California passed the Notice of Security 
Breach Act to address these concerns and “punish firms for cyber security failures” (Singh 2016). 
This law was passed prior to the rise of more severe cybersecurity breeches starting around 2004 




During the 2015-2019 time period, California appears to be continuing to lead the pack on 
this issue. The two newest laws, Assembly Bill No. 1678, Chapter 96 (AB 1678) and Assembly 
Bill No. 1859, Chapter 532 (AB 1859), add to the code on security breaches by explicitly stating 
that entities holding voter registrations information and consumer credit report information must 
maintain adequate security and disclose any breaches (NCSL 2020). AB 1678 empowers the 
Secretary of State for California to “adopt regulations that describe the best practices for storage 
and security of voter registration information received by an applicant” (California 2018). In other 
words, any entities taking or storing voter registration information will have instructions and 
requirements from the state on how best to secure this data. This aspect of the law should increase 
cybersecurity by establishing minimum standards that must be met by organizations holding this 
information. AB 1678 also requires that entities that take or hold voter registration data, “shall, 
following discovery or notification of a breach in the security of the storage of the information, 
disclose the breach in security to the Secretary of State. The disclosure shall be made in the most 
expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay” (California 2018). This requirement 
holds these entities responsible by requiring they disclose breaches. This part of the law should 
increase cybersecurity by transferring some of the costs of a cybersecurity failure back on the 
entity responsible for protecting that information. The law’s weakness is that it only affects entities 
that receive or hold voter data and it does not prescribe any specific penalties or sanctions on 
entities that fail to properly secure data. 
On the other hand, AB 1859 focuses on consumer credit reporting agencies. This law builds 
on existing California law, which already requires consumer credit reporting agencies to adopt 
reasonable cybersecurity measures to protect consumers’ data. AB 1859 makes the law more 




vulnerabilities in a timely manner and to take “reasonable compensating controls to reduce the risk 
of a breach caused by computer system vulnerability until the software update is complete […]” 
(California 2018). Further, the law holds these entities responsible for addressing these 
vulnerabilities whether the entity knows of the vulnerability or “reasonably should know” 
(California 2018). In other words, these companies must employ good cyber hygiene as they are 
required to promptly update and secure any vulnerabilities that become known. Promoting good 
cyber hygiene should enhance cybersecurity by reducing the ability for attackers to use known 
vulnerabilities.  
 
Results of Breaches Legislation 
 California has developed laws to address security breaches, which match up with 
suggestions from cybersecurity experts, such as encouraging good cyber hygiene. While the state 
has been a leader in this area since 2003, finding direct evidence of any one of the state’s laws is 
difficult as there have been few studies on the results of these laws. However, one way we can 
examine this effect is through a counterfactual. This section will first look at cybersecurity 
legislation through a counterfactual and then look at a new law passed in California that has wide-
reaching effects.  
First we should imagine what the world would look like if the legislation on cybersecurity, 
in particular breaches, did not exist. Would there be more ransomware attacks? It is difficult to 
know for certain, but the research presented in the previous chapters suggests there likely would 
be more ransomware attacks. Organizations, including state and local governments, have 
historically tended to not focus resources on cybersecurity. According to some sources, the 
cybersecurity expenditure is roughly 2% of the IT budget (Robinson and Subramanian 2016). 




example, when a data breach occurs often the data compromised is personal identifiable 
information an organization was storing on its customers. This information is often then sold on 
the dark web and used in identity theft crimes. Yet, if one or more of an organization’s customer’s 
identies were stolen there is very little, if any cost to the organization, but a potentially great cost 
to the customer. Thus, without outside incentive an organization has less concern for certain 
aspects of cybersecurity because there is virtually no cost for cybersecurity failure. These outside 
incentives come from cybersecurity legislation.  
One important piece of legislation addressing these misaligned incentives is the California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. This law was passed by California in 2018 and has disrupted the 
status quo enough to have a flurry of articles written on how companies must adapt to these new 
conditions. Below I examine this law in more detail, but first I touch on why it was not included 
in the NCSL database and, therefore, this study. Then I discuss the effects of the law to see how it 
is promoting increased cybersecurity both in California and around the globe.  
 The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 or Assembly Bill No. 375, Chapter 55, was 
passed in 2018. The law’s focus is on the protection of California citizen’s privacy and gives back 
ownership of an individual’s data to the individual. Previously, companies have largely been able 
to obtain and sell consumer’s data, which includes personal information, especially important 
marketing factors, without informing the consumer or providing any means for the consumer to 
opt out. The law gives power back to the consumer by requiring businesses to disclose what 
personal information is collected, the purpose for collecting it, and what types of third parties this 
data is shared with. Further, the law allows consumers to be allowed to opt out and request their 




 The focus of this law is clearly on privacy, which is most likely the reason it was missed 
by the NCSL and not included in their database of cybersecurity legislation. However, the law also 
has provisions that would meet the definition of a breach law if it was in this study. First, the law 
requires that companies provide reasonable protection of personal information. Second, it requires 
that if the entity holding the personal information suffers a security breach, then it must disclose 
the breach. The law even includes penalties for failure up to $7,500 per incident (California 2018). 
Thus, the law would have been included in this study had it been in the NCSL database.  
Since this law was not included there are certainly some implications for the model. First, 
while the NCSL provides a comprehensive database, the lack of inclusion of this law shows that 
at least one law was missed. There certainly could be additional laws which were not included that 
should have been. However, given the NCSL’s close relationship with state legislatures, I believe 
the likelihood of substantial missing data is low. Second, the lack of this law could potentially 
skew the results of the models as this law has certainly had an effect on organizations. However, 
this effect should be minimal as the focus of this law is on businesses, but this dissertation focuses 
on ransomware attacks against state and local government institutions.  
 While the law was passed in California, it is affecting businesses throughout the United 
States and the world. Hildebrand, et al. (2020) explain, “In contrast to most United States data 
protection laws, which apply only to certain industries, the CCPA regulates organizations in any 
industry that meet the statutory requirements.” Further, the law defines business broadly and 
includes companies that “Buys, sells, or receives for the business’s commercial purposes the 
personal information of 50,000 or more California consumers, households, or devices per year” 
(Hildebrand, et al. 2020). In other words, a company does not need to be based or even do direct 




residents or even their devices, such as cell phones, then it would be potentially subject to this law 
and its statutes.  
Due to this widespread effect, companies throughout the world have had to take action. 
California did give companies time to take appropriate action. While the law was passed in 2018, 
it did not go into effect until January 1, 2020. This law has set off a flurry of articles from lawyers 
(Del Pizzo 2018), investors (Hildebrand 2020), and cybersecurity companies (De Groot 2020) on 
how companies should prepare to be in compliance with this law. Thus, the law has put the 
responsibility of cybersecurity on these companies and they are now taking it upon themselves to 
make sure they are in compliance by, among other things, ensuring their cybersecurity is up to 








This dissertation focused on the effectiveness of state cybersecurity legislation at 
preventing the recently emerged threat of ransomware attacks. The results of the models are mixed. 
The initial models suggest that cybersecurity legislation may be reactionary. However, the models 
estimated using the 2019 subset of the sample provide some evidence that states which have taken 
more preventative measures through cybersecurity legislation, especially focused on security 
breaches, tend to experience fewer ransomware attacks. This chapter explores these findings 
further to offer policy recommendations. First, I summarize the dissertation’s findings. Then, I 
discuss potential policy recommendations. Finally, I conclude with some final considerations and 
suggestions on future research based off these findings.  
 
Summary of Findings 
Ransomware has rapidly emerged as a major cybersecurity threat to state and local 
governments. From towns, like Colonie, to large cities, such as Baltimore, ransomware attacks 
have caused temporary loss of critical services, damages, time and resource consuming recovery 
efforts, and tarnished reputations. Ransomware was there at the onset of the spread of the Internet, 
but did not become a true threat until around 2013 with the development of the first true cryptoviral 
strains of ransomware. Since then, ransomware has become more advanced and targeted allowing 
criminals to increase ransom demands from a few hundred dollars to tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.  The costs of these attacks have exploded from $325 million in 2015 (Morgan 




time to prepare, especially as the target of these attacks shifted suddenly towards them in 2019. 
However, during this same time period many states were actively working towards better 
cybersecurity through various laws. The goal of this dissertation was to assess the effectiveness of 
these laws at preventing ransomware attacks to help policy makers’ future efforts to counter this 
grave threat.   
The previous literature was reviewed to see what previous research had found to answer 
this question. Overall, the field on cybersecurity legislation is immature, but there have been some 
notable contributions. Kelly (2012), Newmeyer (2012), Rosner (2017), Blomquist (2020), and 
Pylant (2020) debate if centralized, decentralized, or a hybrid cybersecurity framework is the best 
approach. While Hathaway (2013), Hathaway, et al. (2015), Spidareli (2015), and Rosner (2017), 
attempt to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity legislation through qualitative measures. The 
literature lacks quantitative studies on cybersecurity effectiveness. Pylant (2020) helps to start to 
fill this gap by using quantitative analysis in assessing cybersecurity legislation based on states 
utilization of National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) five key functions. Still 
through this research no previous studies were found that quantitatively examined the effectiveness 
of cybersecurity legislation at actually reducing cyber-attacks.  
This dissertation set to fill this gap in the literature. I compared the state cybersecurity 
legislation from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) that was passed from 2015-
2019 with data on the number of ransomware attacks per state from 2015-2019 from Freed (2019). 
There were five trends of legislation, including laws on training and security breaches, in the NCSL 
database. The literature suggested that legislation that increased training, up to date anti-virus 
software, and good cyber hygiene would be most successful at preventing ransomware attacks 




statistically. These models provide mixed evidence that states that enacted more cybersecurity 
laws suffered less ransomware attacks. However, analysis represents an important first step in 
pulling together data on cybersecurity legislation and ransomware attacks. The results revealed 
multiple avenues for future research.  
For example, the model suggested that laws on cybersecurity breaches had a negative 
relationship with ransomware attacks. Based on these results, I reviewed this relationship in more 
detail. The literature suggests the success of these laws in preventing ransomware attacks can be 
attributed to the accountability and ownership required in the laws. The security breach laws focus 
on preparing for potential security breaches and requiring entities to disclose breaches within a 
certain time period. The key is that these laws allow the subjects of the law to develop their own 
cybersecurity while placing the ownership with these organizations and holding them accountable 
for their failures. This accountability changes the cost benefit analysis of the subjects, which 
without legislation is likely to hold cybersecurity lower as the costs of failure are not fully absorbed 
by the organization (Moore 2010). Thus, these laws change the “misaligned incentives” (Moore 
2010) or the cost benefit analysis of these organizations by increasing the costs of cybersecurity 
failure. With higher costs for cybersecurity failure, these organizations then are incentivized to 
invest in cybersecurity initiatives, such as training, up to date anti-virus programs, and good cyber 
hygiene, themselves.  
   
Policy Recommendations 
As states and local leaders continue to adjust to the rapidly emerging threat of ransomware, 
it is important to provide them with any insights that could help them to develop the most effective 




not offer particular policy prescriptions, but does provide guidance on the types of policies which 
should be enacted.  Yang, et al. (2020) find information sharing can increase an organization’s 
cybersecurity investment. While Pylant (2020) argues that states should take a centralized 
approach to best provide the NIST’s five key functions, “identify, protect, detect, respond, and 
recover.”  
Yet, one exception comes with Spidalieri (2015), who adapted Hathaway’s (2013) 
cybersecurity criteria for nations to be used to assess states. Spidalieri (2015) provides major 
categories, such as cybersecurity strategic plan and incident response, based on Hathaway (2013), 
but further breaks down each category into more specific qualities that make effective cyber 
readiness. Similar to Pylant (2020), she recommends states adhere to the NIST framework. She 
also argues it is necessary to have competent authority, regular threat assessment, and good cyber 
hygiene (Spidalieri 2015). Still she does not prioritize these actions and her focus was on 
cybersecurity in general, not only on preventing ransomware.  
To prepare for ransomware attacks, cybersecurity experts argue that there are three aspects 
which need to be addressed: prevention, mitigation, and recovery (Savage, et al. 2015; Pope 2016; 
Salvi and Kerkar 2016; Sittig and Singh 2016; Richardson and North 2017; Nadir and Bakhshi 
2018; KnowBe4 2020). Due in part to data limitations, this dissertation focused on prevention, 
which aims to stop ransomware attacks before they cause damage. Methods of prevention include 
training, up to date antivirus programs, and good cyber hygiene (Savage, et al. 2015; Pope 2016). 
However, the cybersecurity literature agrees that no prevention strategy is invulnerable, so 
mitigation and recovery need to be planned for as well. These strategies should, among other 




2016; Nadir and Bakhshi 2018; KnowBe4 2020) which can both mitigate an attack by reducing 
the amount of damage caused and provide a relatively quick recovery solution.  
Now these specific aspects of cybersecurity defense have been thoroughly prescribed by 
cybersecurity experts and scholars previously, but legislators need to know the best way to transfer 
these recommendations into effective policy. This dissertation assessed state cybersecurity 
legislation effects on the number of ransomware attacks. Some of the regression models provide 
evidence that cybersecurity breach legislation have a negative relationship with the number of 
ransomware attacks. One possible reason for this decrease is that these laws have increased the 
accountability and ownership of the subjects of the laws, which changed their cost benefit analysis 
incentivizing them to invest in cybersecurity or face consequences for cybersecurity failures 
(Moore 2010). These laws left the actual cybersecurity decisions in the hands of the organizations, 
who surely engaged with cybersecurity experts.  
The research presented here suggests that states should focus on laws which promote 
organizations to enhance their cybersecurity autonomously by making the cost cybersecurity 
failures to be carried by the organization as opposed to society. Legislators should enact laws 
which directly focus on this promotion, similar to the security breach laws which were 
implemented in this study period. These laws would require that organizations are responsible for 
the security of the data that they retain and enact penalties for failure to properly secure data. This 
would push organizations to enhance their cybersecurity to avoid the penalties. These companies 
would then turn to cybersecurity experts who would likely recommend training, up to date 
antivirus programs, and good cyber hygiene (Savage, et al. 2015; Pope 2016), which should reduce 




In addition to direct measures, indirect legislation that encourages adoption of 
cybersecurity insurance could also accomplish similar goals. As hinted at earlier in this study, the 
relationship between ransomware and insurance is complex. Ransomware and insurance have 
inadvertently entered into a symbiotic relationship. Due to increased ransomware attacks more 
organizations are buying cybersecurity insurance, but because insurance often suggests paying the 
ransom to avoid costly recovery, they make ransomware profitable leading to more ransomware 
attacks (Dudley 2019). Despite these complexities, cybersecurity insurance should better prepare 
organizations. The underwriting process to obtain insurance helps organizations identify 
cybersecurity weaknesses and best practices. The insurance company wants to limit its risk and 
will either make an organization with poor cybersecurity pay more in premium for insurance or 
even refuse to write a policy for the organization until they improve their cybersecurity 
(Nakashima 2015). However, within this study the model did not support that laws on insurance 
had an effect on ransomware attacks. Yet, most of these laws focused on regulations of the insurers, 
to make sure that they are properly securing their data, which means they would have little effect 
on the number of ransomware attacks in this study because only state and local institutions were 
included in the data. Thus, there is still reason to believe that, similar to the more direct legislation 
of the security breach legislation, encouraging the adoption of cybersecurity insurance would 
increase organization’s cybersecurity. Certainly more research is needed on the effect of 
cybersecurity insurance legislation on cybersecurity.  
While these two methods address cybersecurity in the near term, long term policy solutions 
should still be considered.  In particular, training, education, and workforce development should 
be given serious consideration as long term policy prescriptions. While the variable, training 




effect, it was most likely due to the timeframe that these programs need to be effective. These 
types of programs include scholarships for cybersecurity degrees with requirements to work for 
the state or local institution for a certain amount of time upon completion of the degree. The benefit 
of these types of programs is that it addresses the lack of talented labor in many areas and due to 
the fact that private sector jobs can offer much higher pay (Robinson and Subramanian 2016). 
Given the long timeframe for these types of programs to become effective, these types of laws 
should still be considered now to help improve cybersecurity in the long term.  
These three policy prescriptions will help states and local institutions to be more effective 
at preventing ransomware attacks. Of course, the additional measures to mitigate and recover from 
attacks are still critical to an overall strategy. In the end, the cybersecurity professionals should be 
entrusted and given the tools needed to implement multifaceted cybersecurity strategies. To help 
ensure organizations provide the level of focus needed for effective cybersecurity, states should 
enact laws which require organizations to protect their data and systems and punish them for 
failures. States should also consider laws which encourage cybersecurity insurance, which can 
help to accomplish the similar goals. Finally, to plan for long term cybersecurity, states should 
also consider laws which provide training, education, and workforce development.  
 
Final Considerations 
More state and local institutions will find their agency or city taken hostage by anonymous 
ransomware criminals unless effective policies are adopted which can help prevent these crippling 
attacks from occurring. This dissertation explored the cybersecurity legislation passed from 2015-
2019. The results of the study were mixed, with models of the initial period suggesting 




focused on the number of ransomware attacks in 2019 and provided some support that 
cybersecurity legislation, and in particular security breach laws, may be negatively associated with 
the number of ransomware attacks.  Thus, while the results of the models were mixed this 
dissertation was an important step in exploring the relationship between cybersecurity legislation 
and ransomware attacks.  
This dissertation filled a hole in the literature by providing the first assessment of the 
effectiveness of cybersecurity legislation at preventing ransomware attacks. However, much more 
research on cybersecurity legislation is needed as the field is still developing. There are many 
potential avenues for additional research, but the results from the model found a few promising 
opportunities.  
First, one of the limits of this dissertation was that the readily accessible data on 
cybersecurity legislation did not begin until 2015. From the review of cybersecurity legislation 
history, we know that California was the first state to enact its own cybersecurity legislation back 
in 2003. Cybersecurity legislation from prior to 2015 could help to better explain the number of 
ransomware attacks from 2015-2018. In addition, the model does not address implementation or 
enforcement of the laws. Thus, future research should focus on compiling data on the cybersecurity 
legislation passed prior to 2015 and including a measure of implementation and enforcement into 
the model.  
Second, another potential research path would be to perform a deeper examination of state 
training laws. As mentioned above, state cybersecurity legislation existed prior to the 2015 time 
period. Many states have had cybersecurity training laws but many are voluntary. It would be 




attacks. If mandatory training is more effective, this would certainly be an important finding for 
legislators to consider in future laws.  
Third, this dissertation investigated the theoretical ties between legislation on breaches and 
increased cybersecurity by organizations. The breach laws often state that organizations, such as 
businesses or government institutions, are responsible for reasonable measures to protect certain 
kinds of data. The laws theoretically accomplish this by requiring breaches to be reported to both 
a state government official and to the affected parties, which places some of the costs of a breach 
back on to the organization due to potential reputation costs. However, the link between the 
legislation and how the organizations have actually responded has not been fully investigated. 
Future research could focus on what changes organizations have actually made as a result of these 
laws. This research could be similar to Yang, et al. (2020) which studied the effects of the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) of 2015 publicly traded companies’ cybersecurity 
investment. However, that study’s focus left out how smaller businesses or other organizations 
reacted to that law. To broaden the implications future research could perform interviews of 
varying organizations to see what changes they made as a result of a particular cybersecurity law. 
Finally, some of the models found support that having a Republican governor had a 
negative effect on ransomware attacks. However, political party was not a focus of this 
dissertation. More research is needed to better understand the relationship between political party 
and cybersecurity. As stated previously, there was some evidence that suggested Republicans at 
the federal level favored a decentralized approach to cybersecurity (Kelly 2012). Yet, Pylant 
(2020) argued that centralized or hybrid approaches were more effective for cybersecurity at the 
state level. Thus, additional research should also focus on if political parties are more likely to 




central debates in the cybersecurity legislation field by potentially supporting or challenging the 
previous studies.  
Additional research on this topic is needed now as cybercriminals have not hesitated in 
their development of ransomware. Legislators need the best information to craft effective policies 
to combat this growing threat. States who continue to fail to take action on cybersecurity and 
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